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Abstract 
Objective: Experimental evidence indicates that those with a wide range of mental 
health conditions show an attentional bias for specific threat relevant information, 
(e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007) with research beginning to explore whether this same 
threat sensitivity occurs in survivors of acquired brain injury (ABI; Gracey, Evans, & 
Malley, 2009; Riley, Brennan, & Powell, 2004; Riley, Dennis, & Powell, 2010). This 
study explored, experimentally, whether those with an ABI demonstrate an attentional 
bias towards threatening stimuli (negative evaluation/physically threatening), and 
what factors may influence this bias. 
Method: 35 participants who had sustained an ABI completed a visual dot-probe task, 
alongside measures of self-discrepancy, affective distress and executive functioning.    
Results: Whilst the pattern of results is indicative of this threat detection hypothesis, 
the difference between threat and neutral trials was found to be non-significant (p = 
.053). Exploratory analyses indicated that executive functioning and affective distress 
may act as contributing factors to attentional bias. Self-discrepancy between past and 
current self did not have an impact on attentional bias to negative evaluation stimuli, 
although discrepancy between current and pre-injury/ideal self was found to correlate 
with anxiety and depression. 
Conclusions: The hypotheses were not supported in this study. The clinical and 
theoretical implications are discussed (e.g., aetiology of threat/affective difficulties 
and implications for treatment), alongside limitations of the study (e.g., potential 
sampling considerations) and potential directions for further research are suggested 
(e.g., exploring potential contributing factors) to help us to further understand the 
factors that may be involved in attentional bias to threat following brain injury. 
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Chapter One: Acquired Brain Injury and Psychosocial Consequences 
1.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter will firstly outline background literature regarding acquired brain 
injury, including its definition, prevalence and the different areas of a person’s 
functioning that it can impact upon. Following this, relevant literature concerning 
attentional bias to threat (and its application in both mental health and brain injury 
populations) and self-identity following brain injury will be presented, including a 
literature review on the effect upon ‘self’ following an acquired brain injury. Finally, 
the rationale for the current thesis is given in light of this, and hypotheses for the study 
detailed.  
1.2 Acquired Brain Injury 
 Acquired brain injury (ABI) is an inclusive category that embraces acute (rapid 
onset) brain injury of any cause, including trauma (head injury/post-surgical damage), 
vascular accident (stroke or subarachnoid haemorrhage), cerebral anoxia, infections 
(such as meningitis or encephalitis) or other toxic or metabolic insults (e.g., 
hypoglycaemia) (British Society of Rehabilitation Medicine, 2003). ABI is considered 
to be one of the leading causes of death and disability in young adults (Walsh, Fortune, 
Gallagher, & Muldoon, 2012) and, with many of the experienced changes invisible to 
those around them, it has been termed a silent epidemic (Jones, Haslam, Jetten, 
Williams, Morris, & Saroyan, 2010). 
 1.2.1 Prevalence of acquired brain injury. 
 Due to the wide range of conditions that are encompassed under the umbrella 
term of ABI, it is difficult to accurately estimate the prevalence of ABI in the 
population, although there are estimates of around one million people attending A&E 
services each year with an injury to the head (Kay & Teasdale, 2001; King & 
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Tyerman, 2008). Of these, approximately 90% are classed as a mild head injury, 5% 
as a moderate head injury and 5% as a severe head injury (Kay & Teasdale, 2001), 
with a similar breakdown being found in studies in the United States (Narayan et al., 
2002). Using data from head injuries requiring any sort of inpatient care, Tennant 
(2005) found the incidence rate of admission to hospital following a head injury was 
high, with 229.4 per 100,000 for all age groups in England. Of those seen with a 
minor head injury, the majority will not be admitted to hospital, and for those who are, 
most will be able to go home after 48 hours (National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence, 2003), with 92% having a normal neurology following this (Klauber, 
1993). Stroke and traumatic brain injury (TBI) are reported to make up the largest 
proportion of ABI in the United Kingdom, with incidence of TBI estimated at 
approximately 235 cases per 100,000 per year (Tagliaferri, Compagnone, Korsic, 
Servadei, & Kraus, 2006) and stroke incidence estimated at 7.20 per 1000 (Lee, Shafe, 
& Cowie, 2011).  
 Furthermore, the incidence of ABI is influenced by specific demographic and 
social factors; there tend to be higher rates among young adults and older adults, 
compared to those of middle age, while a brain injury is more likely occur in males 
than females (Greenwald, Burnett & Miller, 2003; Powell, 2004; Tennant, 1995; 2005; 
Yates, Williams, Harris, Round, & Jenkins, 2006). Taking TBI specifically, the 
highest prevalence is found in children between the ages of 0 – 4, and in late 
adolescence, between 15 – 19 years of age (Langlois, Rutland-Brown, & Wald, 2004; 
Yates et al., 2006). In addition, the incidence of brain injury is influenced by location, 
with higher rates of head injury found in more urban areas (Yates et al., 2006) and one 
study in England finding that the variance in inpatient head injuries ranged from 90.7 
per 100,000 (in Brent and Harrow) up to 419.4 per 100,000 (in Liverpool) (Tennant, 
 
 
3 
 
2005). These studies also examined socio-economic factors, finding that increased 
unemployment (in the 16 – 24 years age range), permanent sickness (in the working 
age population), social deprivation (in children under 5 years) and lone parenting 
increased the incidence rate of head injuries, whereas an increasing percentage of 
those using public transport to go to work decreased the incidence rate (Tennant, 2005; 
Yates et al., 2006).  
 1.2.2 Classification of acquired brain injury. 
 In this field, the classification of brain injuries has generally been based on 
injury severity at presentation, predominantly around neurologic injury severity 
criteria (Saatman et al, 2008).  The most commonly used scale is the Glasgow Coma 
Scale (Teasdale & Jennett, 1974) because of its high inter-observer reliability and 
reported prognostic capabilities (Narayan et al., 2002). This scale depends upon 
evaluation of both depth and duration of altered consciousness (Lezak, Howieson, 
Bigler, & Tranel, 2012) and measures injury severity across the three dimensions of 
eye opening, verbal responses and motor response, (with lower scores indicating a 
more significant impairment) summed together to form a Glasgow Coma Score  
(Teasdale & Jennett, 1974). This is then divided into subtypes, with scores of 13 – 15 
classed as mild brain injury, 9 – 12 classified as moderate brain injury and below 8 
indicating severe brain injuries (Teasdale & Jennett, 1974). 
 Aside from the Glasgow Coma Scale, other methods can be used to determine 
injury severity and functional outcome, including length of coma and the duration of 
post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) (Bates, 2001; Russell & Smith, 1961; Sherer, Struchen, 
Yablon, Wang, & Nick, 2008).  Length of coma can also be used as a predictor of 
injury severity and functional outcomes, measured by the number of days an 
individual is unable to follow commands or spontaneously open their eyes (Bates, 
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2001). PTA is defined as a transient state of confusion and disorientation, 
characterised by intellectual and behavioural disturbances (Ahmed, Bierley, Sheikh, & 
Date, 2000; Levin & Goldstein, 1989). A PTA of less than 1 hour indicates a mild 
brain injury, 1 – 24 hours indicates moderate brain injury, and longer than this is 
classed as a severe brain injury (Russell & Smith, 1961).  
 1.2.3 Mechanisms of injury in acquired brain injury. 
 As the category of ABI encompasses varying conditions, there are different 
mechanisms which cause the subsequent brain injury, which can either be primarily 
focal (in a specific location in the brain) or diffuse (over a widespread area of the 
brain) (Gennarelli, 1993). Focal injuries often result from direct force applied to the 
skull or brain, such as a Cerebral Contusion; this is defined as bruising of the brain 
tissue primarily caused by forceful contact between the surface of the brain and the 
inside of the skull or by rapid acceleration-deceleration forces, often substantially 
affecting the frontal and temporal lobes (Chu et al., 1994; Gennarelli, 1993; Granacher, 
2003; Werner & Engelhard, 2007). Similar to this is a Cerebral Laceration, which is 
clinically defined as an injury which the Pia Mater and Arachnoid layers of the 
Meninges (the protective membrane that surrounds the central nervous system) are 
torn at the injury site (Granacher, 2003). This requires a greater physical force to 
generate than a contusion (Granacher, 2003).   
 Another type of focal injury is that of a specific haemorrhage, in which blood 
escapes from a ruptured blood vessel, potentially leading to a hematoma (a collection 
of blood outside the blood vessels due to tearing) (King & Tyerman, 2008; Teale, 
Liffe, & Young, 2014). Within the context of brain injury, there are different types of 
haemorrhage named for where the bleeding occurs in the brain or skull, and whilst a 
full discussion of these specific types is beyond the scope of this thesis (see King & 
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Tyerman, 2008 for an overview), the type of damage that occurs following these 
injuries is typically related to the site of the bleed. These can continue to cause further 
damage following the bleed, causing expanding intracranial lesions and increased 
intracranial pressure, which compress the surface of the brain inside the skull, forming 
contusions and limiting blood supply to other areas of the brain (Granacher, 2003).   
In serious cases, sustained intracranial pressure can cause brain herniation which can 
shift the structures of the brain, causing damage which is often fatal (Marcoux, 2005).  
 Diffuse injuries are multifocal injuries, causing damage throughout multiple 
areas of the brain. One of the most prevalent of these injuries is diffuse axonal injuries 
where there is widespread tearing or shearing of axons in the white matter of the brain 
due to violent movement stretching and compressing the axons (King & Tyerman, 
2008). This has the consequences of disrupting the connections across the brain. The 
subsequent swelling and consequences of intracranial pressure (such as ischemic brain 
injury from insufficient blood supply), as previously described, can also be seen as 
diffuse injuries, which can cause damage across multiple areas of the brain (Granacher, 
2003).  
1.3 Impairments Following Acquired Brain Injury 
 Advances in medical care have meant that there has been a massive 
improvement in the survival rate of those experiencing an ABI, meaning that those 
who would have previously succumbed to the metabolic, hemodynamic or other 
complications as a result of the head injury are now surviving (Diedler et al, 2009; 
Ghajar, 2000; Jagannathan et al, 2007). Moderate or severe disability and difficulties 
are found to occur commonly following these injuries (Thomsen, 1984; Thornhill, 
Teasdale Murray, McEwen, Roy, & Penny, 2000), although even after very serious 
head injuries, long term outcomes for some patients are reasonably good, with some 
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improvement in functional abilities, psychosocial adjustment and work capacity 
(Thomsen, 1984). Age is a significant factor in regards to outcomes from brain injury, 
with estimates of mortality of 19% in patients aged 20 years old, rising steeply to 71% 
in those aged 60 and over (Hickey, 1997). 
 Those that do survive a brain injury often experience a wide range of 
impairments, which can encompass cognitive, emotional, behavioural, social and 
physical difficulties (Kersel, Marsh, Havill, & Sleigh, 2001; Lezak, 2012). Many of 
these domains overlap in regards to the impairments that they can generate, and 
difficulties in one area will often cause difficulties in another. These will be briefly 
elaborated on below (please see Tyerman & King, 2008 for a more comprehensive 
examination). 
 1.3.1 Cognitive difficulties following brain injury. 
 Survivors of brain injuries often experience severe and enduring cognitive 
deficits, such as impairments in memory, attention, executive functioning, language 
and a slowing of information processing (Khan, Baguley, & Cameron, 2003; 
Salmond, Menon, Chatfield, Pickard,& Sahakian, 2005).  Most survivors experience a 
period of PTA in the short term following their brain injury, with associated shorter 
term cognitive difficulties (Wilson, Evans, & Williams, 2008). 
 When considering memory, the frontal and temporal lobes are crucially 
involved, particularly in the acquisition of new factual knowledge in the latter case 
(Tranel & Damasio, 1995), yet these are some of the most common sites for damage 
in a closed head injury (Kapur, 1988). Memory as a concept is viewed as having many 
types and mechanisms, including short term, long term, prospective, working, explicit, 
implicit, recall and recognition; all of which can be affected in differing ways due to 
an acquired brain injury (Wilson et al., 2008). Rehabilitation of memory problems is 
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difficult, with recovery being influenced to a certain degree by the type of acquired 
brain injury, the patient’s age and the length of PTA experienced (Wilson et al., 2008).   
 The frontal lobes are also associated with other areas of cognitive functioning, 
including attention and executive functioning which, alongside memory, are found to 
be the most common cognitive disturbances following TBI (Arciniegas, Held, & 
Wagner, 2002). Executive functions are higher order cognitive abilities that enable a 
person’s planning, problem solving, organisation, self-monitoring, initiation, error 
correction and behavioural regulation (Evans, 2008). Executive functioning is highly 
susceptible to damage given the vulnerability of the frontal lobes to the decelerative 
forces and shearing actions involved in many traumatic brain injuries (McHugh & 
Wood, 2008), with difficulties in lack of initiative, adaptation and cognitive flexibility 
being common (Kinsella, Packer, & Oliver, 1991; Tate, 1999). Executive functioning 
also has an influencing factor in the regulation of emotions (Zelazo & Cunningham, 
2007), and better ability to control emotions has been associated with a person’s 
psychological wellbeing (Côté, Gyurak, & Levenson, 2010). Although some patients 
show improvement in regards to cognitive functioning following ABI, for many, 
certain impairments do continue and become long term difficulties (Dikmen, 
Corrigan, Levin, Machamer, Stiers, & Weisskopf, 2009; Draper & Ponsford, 2008). 
 1.3.2 Emotional difficulties following brain injury. 
Emotional disorders are extremely common after an ABI (Broomfield, Quinn, 
Abdul-Rahim, Walters, & Evans, 2014; Fann, Burington, Leonetti, Jaffe, Katon, & 
Thompson, 2004; Kim et al, 2007; Silver, Kramer, Greenwalds, & Weissman, 2001), 
sometimes arising as a direct consequence of specific damage to areas of the brain 
(Jorge, Robinson, Moser, Tateno, Crespo-Facorro, & Arndt, 2004). As survivors go 
through various stressors and transition periods adjusting to their new self, emotional 
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difficulties can also emerge as a reaction to the injury, trauma or its subsequent 
consequences (Ownsworth et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2011b). There has been a series 
of papers examining psychiatric disorders such as depression and anxiety (Deb et al., 
1999; Jorge, Robinson, Arndt, Forrestor, Geisler, & Starkstein, 1993; Jorge, Robinson, 
Arndt, Starkstein, Forrestor, & Geisler, 1993; Jorge et al., 2004; Kreutzer, Seel, & 
Gourley, 2001; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984), psychosis (Davison & Bagley, 1969) 
and post-traumatic stress disorder (Bryant & Harvey, 1998; Gil, Caspi, Ben-Ari, 
Koren, & Klein, 2005; Mayou, Black, & Bryant, 2000) following ABI, with many 
individuals qualifying for two or more diagnoses (Hibbard, Uysal, Kepler, Bogdany, 
& Silver, 1998).   
Outside of formal psychiatric diagnosis, there are other emotional difficulties 
associated with the onset of an ABI, with sadness in the early stages of recovery from 
brain injury focusing on separation from home, family and the loss of their familiar 
routines (McGrath & Adams, 1999). Whilst engaged in rehabilitation, anxieties can 
emerge around fear of falling, fear of physical harm and concerns around not making 
sufficient rehabilitation progress (Collicutt McGrath, 2008). At the end of their 
journey, discharge from hospital can signal the end point of major recovery, often 
accompanied by the loss of most professional support networks. This means that 
patients can feel abandoned at the time that they begin to realise the reality of their 
long term situation (Turner, Fleming, Ownsworth, & Cornwell, 2011a; Tyerman, 
1988).  The prevalence of suicidal ideation, suicide attempts and hopelessness have 
also been investigated in a TBI population.  For example, Simpson and Tate (2002) 
found that levels of hopelessness and suicidal ideation were significantly higher than 
those reported in non-TBI populations, and 18% of participants reported a post-injury 
attempt. 
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 1.3.3 Behavioural difficulties following brain injury. 
 Following a brain injury, behavioural changes are very common, and have 
been recognised as a major consequence in research for a long time. The classic 
account of this is the case of Phineas Gage, who after an injury to the head, was 
described as fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity and being 
radically changed, so decidedly that his friends and acquaintances said he was no 
longer Gage (Harlow, 1868; Macmillan, 2000; Ratie, Talos, Haker, Lieberman, & 
Everett, 2004). Reported behavioural difficulties may include increased impulsivity, 
apathy, irritability, aggression, agitation and socially inappropriate behaviours 
(Alderman, 2003; McAllister, 2008; Ponsford, Oliver, & Curran, 1995; Prigatano, 
1992; Wood, 2001). Research has found that these behavioural and personality 
changes are often the ones which cause the most difficulties for the patient’s family to 
cope with post injury (e.g., Knight, Devereux, & Godfrey, 1998; O’Shanick, & 
O’Shanick, 1994; Oddy & Herbert, 2003). Behavioural changes and outcomes 
following ABI are highly dependent on the size and severity of the injury, area of the 
brain and circuitry disrupted by the injury (Cummings, 1993; Fletcher, Levin, Lachar, 
Kusnerik, Harward, Mendelsohn, & Lilly, 1996). For example, damage to the 
orbitofrontal cortex is associated with anti-social conduct, low tolerance of frustration, 
ego-centricity, poor social judgement and social awareness, whereas medial-frontal 
difficulties are associated with low arousal, absence of drive and poor motivation 
(Worthington & Wood, 2008). 
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 1.3.4 Social difficulties following brain injury. 
 Many studies of those who have experienced a brain injury show that there are 
significant losses and breakdowns in various aspects of their social and support 
networks. The most significant of these are the breakdown in relationships and 
changes in their role within the family (Morton & Wehman, 1995). Research has 
found that two years after injury, the number of close friends had diminished and been 
replaced primarily with casual acquaintances (Weddell, Oddy & Jenkins, 1980), and 
that as time since injury increases, the size of social networks decreased as people and 
families become more socially isolated (Kozloff, 1987; Oddy & Humphrey, 1980). 
This may be due to a series of factors, including the increase in time spent caring for 
the injured person, difficulties inviting guests as a result of 
inappropriate/unpredictable behaviour, or the person’s inability to converse in a 
rewarding way for visitors (Oddy & Herbert, 2008).  
 Furthermore, sexual changes are common following brain injury (Giaquinto, 
Buzzelli, Di Francesco, & Nolfe, 2003) and often impact upon a person’s ability to 
establish, maintain and enjoy intimate relationships with others (Ownsworth, 2014). 
The younger age group most often affected by TBI is at a significant point in the 
development of social skills and identity through friendships and is at a period in life 
when a person is developing towards social and economic independence (Morton & 
Wehman, 1995; Rosenbam & Najenson, 1976), amplifying the impact of the injury. 
These obviously have subsequent implications for emotional difficulties, with many 
studies reporting that subsequent loneliness is a prominent factor following a brain 
injury (e.g., Harrick, Krefting, Johnston, Carlson, & Minnes, 1994; Oddy, Couglan, 
Tyerman, & Jenkins, 1985). Outcome studies following those with a brain injury have 
found that potential for returning to work is poor, with those with a TBI experiencing 
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high unemployment levels following their brain injury (Bruckner & Randle, 1972). 
These psychosocial problems decrease the opportunity to develop social contacts or 
uptake new leisure activities, creating a major challenge for successful rehabilitation 
and efforts to integrate back into the community (Gomez-Hernandez, Max, Kosier, 
Paradiso, & Robinson, 1997; Morton & Wehman, 1995).  
 1.3.5 Physical difficulties following brain injury. 
 Physical injury is extremely common following ABI, including motor 
difficulties (Francis, Wade, Turner-Stokes, Kingswell, Dott, & Coxon, 2004), 
swallowing difficulties (Cherney & Halper, 1996), seizures (Vespa et al., 1999), 
fatigue (LaChapelle & Finlayson, 1998) sleep and pain difficulties (Beetar, Guilmette, 
& Sparadeo, 1996). Brain injury, especially of the traumatic subtype, can result in a 
range of symptoms which have been grouped together under the term of ‘post-
concussion syndrome’, with difficulties including headaches, fatigue, irritability, 
dizziness, visual difficulties, sleep difficulties and forgetfulness which persists beyond 
three months (Carroll, Cassidy, Holm, Kraus, & Coronado, 2004; Mittenberg & 
Strauman, 2000). Furthermore, survivors will also often experience difficulties around 
paralysis, motor and balance difficulties, bowel/bladder difficulties, sexual changes 
and auditory difficulties (Giaquinto, et al., 2003; Howes, Benton, & Edwards, 2005; 
Stratton & Gregory, 1994), with longer term implications also including a potential 
risk of psychosis and dementia (Gualtieri & Cox, 1991; Starkstein & Jorge, 2005). 
Physical difficulties are an extremely pertinent aspect of brain injury which reduces 
sense of control and normalcy, with some patients describing their body as “an 
enemy” due to their acquired physical limitations (Jumisko, Lexell, & Soderberg, 
2005). 
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1.4 The Role of Attention 
 Attention is a cognitive function which can be defined as the capacities or 
processes of how an organism becomes receptive to stimuli and how it may begin 
processing incoming or attended to excitation (Parasuraman, 1998).  There is 
significant variation on how this is formally conceptualised and it is notoriously 
difficult to define and measure (Manly & Mattingly, 2004). Posner and Peterson 
(1990;  Peterson & Posner, 2012) posited a neuroanatomical model of attention which 
describes three hieratically arranged attention systems, comprising alertness (sustained 
attention, vigilance and arousal, in the right lateralised frontal-parietal-thalamic 
network), orientation (directed attention/shifting attention, in the posterior attentional 
system) and an executive which detects targets, supervises and controls attention in an 
intentional top down process (based in the frontal lobes and anterior cingulate). This 
model is still broadly supported by neuroscientific evidence which has accumulated 
since the paper was published, with more elaboration and detail on the original 
framework (Petersen & Posner, 2012). However, other characteristics of attention 
which seem to be agreed upon are its finite capacity and the capacities for 
disengagement in order to shift its focus, and for responsivity to particular sensory 
stimuli (Lezak, 2012). These characteristics can be influenced, its ‘capacity’ for 
example, can be affected by depression, fatigue (Zimmerman & Leclercq, 2002), brain 
injury (Rousseaux, Fimm, & Cantagallo, 2002) or even as the natural consequence of 
an ageing brain (Van der Linden & Collette, 2002). Visual attention (a subset of 
general attention), is a feature of our visual system which allows us to select and 
ignore visual information in the environment around us (Chun & Wolfe, 2001). This 
select/ignore mechanism is a necessity given the finite resources that can be allocated 
to attention, compared to amount of visual information available to attend to. 
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 1.4.1 Attentional bias and threat detection. 
 Research has consistently shown that our attention is influenced by factors 
such as emotion (Vuilleumier, Armony, & Dolan, 2003), with cognitive models 
stating that this attentional bias stems from a lower threshold of appraising threat in 
stimuli (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). While an attentional bias towards sufficiently 
threatening stimuli is present for everyone, those with certain difficulties and 
experiences will exhibit this attentional bias towards specific threatening stimuli, as 
these are seen as holding a higher threat value to the person. Theorists often take an 
evolutionary approach to understanding this, as the rapid detection of threat in our 
surrounding environment is critical for species survival (e.g., Green & Phillips, 2004). 
 The neurocognitive sensory systems responsible for the fast and efficient 
detection of emotional or threatening stimuli may have survived as an adaptive 
advantage in accordance with the Darwinian theory of evolution (Darwin, 1955; 
Green & Phillips, 2004; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), with some proposing hard wired, 
dedicated fear modules in the brain which respond rapidly and automatically to such 
stimuli (e.g., Öhman, 1993; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). This seems to be supported by 
cognitive science research, finding that a second target in the attentional blink 
paradigm is less likely to be missed if it is an emotional target (Anderson & Phelps, 
2001), reaction times for detecting targets are faster when the target has an emotional 
value (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Fox, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 1993) or 
have a threatening evolutionary value (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) and threat 
superiority effects are still demonstrated where awareness to stimuli is limited (Mogg 
& Bradley, 1999; Esteves, Dimberg, & Öhman, 1994). Research has even 
demonstrated a physical, bodily reaction to threatening stimuli in the form of skin 
conductance responses (Esteves, et al., 1994) and event-related potentials in both 
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humans (Van Strien et al, 2014; Van Strien, Franken, & Huijding, 2014) and primates 
(Van Le et al., 2013). Furthermore, research has found positive correlations between 
activation of the amygdala and other neural structures associated with threat and 
attentional biases (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Monk, Nelson, Woldehawariat, 
Montgomery, Zarahn, McClure, Guyer, Leibenluft, Charner, Ernst, & Pine, 2004). 
These findings suggest that threatening stimuli have an in-built comparative advantage 
in gaining access to automatic processing.  
LeDoux’s affective neuroscience model (1998; 2000) understands threat 
detection as a process involving multiple areas of the brain, primarily emphasising the 
role of the amygdala in the control of emotional behaviours. The neural pathways of 
the amygdala and thalamus are responsible for the primary threat appraisal. This is a 
rapid and automatic analysis of potentially dangerous stimuli, through thalamic 
pathways which leads to instantaneous, automatic reactions. After this immediate 
reaction, the amygdala is then supported by input from additional brain structures 
(including the hippocampus, frontal lobes and cortical pathways) which provide 
situational context and relevant characteristics of the threatening stimuli. The 
amygdala works to integrate the rapid inputs with more detailed information, after 
which this amygdala activation influences cognitive processes, selective attention, 
perception and explicit memory, to provide continued survival strategies, or to 
terminate and down-regulate this threat response (Steimer, 2002; Yiend, Mackintosh 
& Savulich, 2012). 
1.4.2 Measuring attentional bias. 
This threat bias has been measured in the literature using differing methods, 
either demonstrating how selective attention may benefit performance on tasks, or 
how performance can be influenced as a result of selective attention to emotional 
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information within a paradigm (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). A full 
examination of these methodologies is beyond the scope of this thesis (see Cisler, 
Bacon, & Williams, 2010 for an overview). This thesis will briefly examine two of 
these methods. 
 Firstly, the Emotional Stroop task (MacLeod, 1991; Williams, Mathews, & 
MacLeod, 1996), which requires participants to name the ink colour of a word stimuli 
as quickly and accurately as possible, whilst ignoring the meaning of the word. A 
slower performance on emotional words has been used to indicate an attentional bias 
(Dresler, Mériau, Heekeren, & van der Meer, 2009; MacLeod, 1991; Williams, 
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). This effect has been hypothesised as a hypervigilance 
for specific psychopathological words which attracted attention automatically (Mogg, 
Mathews & Weinman, 1989), or a difficulty disengaging attention from threat-related 
words (Pineles, Shipherd, Welch & Yovel, 2007). However, this has been critiqued, as 
this cannot be confirmed as a mechanism of attention, but instead may be related to 
some aspect of an emotional reaction to the words meaning or wider cognitive 
processes (Bogels & Mansell, 2004; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). 
Secondly, the modified dot probe paradigm (MacLeod et al, 1986) has been 
used extensively in attentional research to highlight and measure the bias towards 
threatening stimuli in experimental conditions, and differs from the Emotional Stroop 
by using multiple stimuli which compete for attentional resources. This task consists 
of presenting a pair of stimuli simultaneously (one emotional, one neutral), followed 
by a target at the location of one of those stimuli. Attentional bias to the emotional 
stimuli is measured as the difference in reaction time to the target when it is presented 
in place of the emotional stimuli as compared to when presented in place of the 
neutral stimuli. A faster response time to a target congruent to the location of the 
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emotional stimuli is interpreted as meaning there is an attentional bias towards 
emotional stimuli. In addition, a bias score can be calculated by subtracting the 
reaction times of congruent trials from those of incongruent trials - a positive bias 
score indicates a vigilance to threat whereas a negative score indicates an avoidance 
from threat (Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995; Vassilopoulos, 2005).  
 1.4.3 Attentional bias in mental and physical health. 
The cognitive-affective literature has repeatedly shown that those with specific 
psychological difficulties or diagnoses demonstrate a more reactive attention to 
specific threatening stimuli linked to these diagnoses, and bias to these threats 
underlies some cognitive models of mental health (Beck, 1976; Wells & Matthew, 
1996). These results have emerged for those with depression (Peckham, McHugh, & 
Otto, 2010), anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg 
& van Ijzendoorn, 2007) such as specific phobia (Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & 
Tresize, 1986; Wenzel & Holt, 1999), generalised anxiety disorder (Becker, Rinck, 
Margraf, & Roth, 2001; Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & De Bono, 1999) post-
traumatic stress disorder (Ashley, Honzel, Larsen, Justus, & Swick, 2013), panic 
disorder (Teachman, Smith-Janik, & Sapority,  2007) and social phobia (Asmundson 
& Stein, 1994; Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; Cisler & Koster, 2010; 
Ononaiye, Turpin, & Reidy, 2007); all demonstrate these emotion-congruent biases. 
This effect has also been demonstrated in those without formalised diagnoses, for 
those who have experienced chronic interpersonal violence (DePierro, D’Andrea, & 
Pole, 2013) and recent trauma (Elesser, Sartory, & Tackenberg, 2004).  
This attentional bias has also been demonstrated in research examining other 
physical conditions such as chronic headaches (Schoth & Liossi, 2010), insomnia 
(Jansson-Frȍjmark, Bermås & Kjellén, 2012), somatoform disorders (Lim & Kim, 
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2005), intellectual disability (van Duijvenbode, Didden, Voogd, Korzilius, & Engels, 
2012) and William’s syndrome (Dodd & Porter, 2011). These biases still exist 
following recovery from a depressive episode (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), and there 
have been attempts to create cognitive-affective models that try to account for many 
of these processing changes in mental health problems (e.g., Mansell, 2005; Williams, 
2006; Wells & Matthews, 1996), with some research finding that inducing negative 
attentional biases can lead to the development of anxiety symptoms in a non-clinical 
population (e.g., Matthews & MacLeod, 2002).   
1.5 Threat Appraisal in Acquired Brain Injury 
The concept of attention and threat appraisal has been tentatively extended to 
the domain of ABI, with previous research showing that attentional processes can be 
influenced by brain injury related trauma (Coates, 2008), and this post brain injury 
threat appraisal is linked to emotional wellbeing and adjustment (Kendall & Terry, 
2009; Rochette, Bravo, Desrosiers, St-Cyr-Tribble, & Borget, 2007). Riley, Brennan 
and Powell (2004) devised a questionnaire to obtain an account of the specific threat 
appraisals (an anticipation of negative consequences that challenge self-concept) 
which patients with TBI make in relation to valued roles and activities. This was 
conceptualised within the context of the stress-appraisal-coping model (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). They specifically looked at the appraisals which led people to use 
avoidance as a coping strategy, finding that the whole sample reported at least one of 
this type of appraisal, and 74% of them reported at least 10. Their data confirmed that 
there seems to be specific occasions which can give rise to these threat appraisals, 
including task performance, social situations and situations in which a person’s 
personal safety is a concern, alongside a fourth, less unified category which centres 
around ‘awkward situations/reminder of the injury’. These threat appraisals were often 
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found to lead to avoidance of activities, and since a core aim of rehabilitation after 
TBI is to try and facilitate a person’s participation in valued roles and activities, 
consideration of an individual’s threat appraisals and how they respond to them 
requires a more prominent place in rehabilitation research (Riley et al., 2004).  
Riley and colleague’s (2004) paper draws upon the concept of the 
‘catastrophic reaction’, developed by Goldstein (1952), a reaction of extreme anxiety 
that is triggered by situations in which the person struggles to complete tasks and 
activities that were completed with ease prior to the brain injury. Goldstein 
hypothesised that this anxiety stemmed from the threat posed to the individual’s 
concept of self by the task failure, and that to protect this self-concept and avoid 
further threat/anxiety, they would start avoiding situations which may trigger these 
catastrophic reactions (Riley et al., 2004). This catastrophic reaction is, according to 
Ben-Yishay (2000) a “behavioural manifestation of a threat to the person’s very 
existence” (p. 128) due to the failure of the person to cope with their difficulties.   
Riley, Brennan and Powell’s (2004) research was then extended and examined 
further in Riley, Dennis and Powell’s (2010) paper, looking at the factors which may 
explain the individual variation in avoidance of activities. They also examined an 
alternative context for which to consider this, using cognitive models of anxiety-
related avoidance normally found within mental health research (referencing Bandura, 
1977 and Beck, Emergy, & Greenberg, 1985). This moved towards a 
conceptualisation which included beliefs around an individual’s own perceived ability 
to cope with a situation, alongside their beliefs about the threat itself. They found that 
those with a negative evaluation of their ability to cope with a brain injury and those 
with self-reported low self-esteem were significantly more likely to respond to these 
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threat appraisals with avoidance, further supporting the idea that threat to self may 
play a major factor in coping with the consequences of a brain injury.  
 This idea of threat to self was also raised by Gracey et al. (2009), in which 
they developed a ‘Y-shaped model’ (see figure 1) to try to account for the 
consequences, changes and outcomes of ABI. They postulated that for a subset of 
survivors, the threat of feared and actual catastrophic meanings associated with the 
person’s post injury situation subsequently leads to the adoption of particular coping 
strategies, such as avoidance and worry, similar to the previously mentioned research 
(Riley et al., 2004; Riley et al., 2010). These ultimately fail to resolve this 
discrepancy, but reduce threat in the short term, leading to poorer psychosocial 
outcomes and ultimately poorer post-injury adjustment. The authors again drew upon 
Goldstein’s (1959) description of difficulties being a combination of organic 
impairment, the catastrophic reaction and loss of skills due to avoidance of this to 
complement their own model, similar to ideas previously described by others within 
this research area (Gracey et al., 2009; Riley, et al, 2004).    
 The ‘Y-shaped model’ also takes into account the role of self-concept and self-
discrepancy in threat, noting previous research which has found that those with a TBI 
experience a comparative self-discrepancy relative to pre-injury and post-injury self, 
which has been found to be a major factor in post-injury adjustment (Arena & Adams, 
unpublished) and mental health (Cantor, Ashman, Schwartz, Gordon, Hibbard, 
Brown, Spielman, Charatz, & Cheng, 2005). This model links the self-discrepancy 
and coping style literature together with the sense of threat to self, which ultimately 
underpins adjustment post-injury.  
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Figure 1. The ‘Y-shaped’ process model of rehabilitation (Gracey et al., 2009) 
 
1.6 Sense of Self in Brain Injury 
 Ownsworth (2014) stated that the research investigating sense of self in brain 
injury has only begun to emerge in the literature over the last few decades, originating 
from the research on self-concept conducted by Tyerman and Humphrey (1984). The 
self has been referred to as the conscious being responsible for unique thoughts and 
actions, which encompasses the collective characteristics we think of as our own, 
including our bodily experiences and internal psychological states (Brinthaupt & 
Lipka, 1992; Ownsworth, 2014).  
 It has been said that a brain injury is best characterised as a developmental 
event representing a fundamental change in the person’s sense of self and how they 
relate to their environment (Moldover, Goldberg, & Prout, 2004). This event is unique 
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in that the person must cope with both the task of mourning for a lost identity and 
construction of a new one, whilst accepting a new set of restrictive neurological 
parameters, acting as ‘a sudden break in the continuity of who the person is’ 
(Moldover et al., 2004). Further to this, most individuals face uncertainty regarding 
their new future, in terms of their survival, recovery level and outcomes (Godfrey, 
Knight, & Partridge, 1996).  
 Research looking at the self in ABI has looked at the process of adjustment 
and coping, since the ongoing stress of ABI for individuals and their families, 
alongside specific transitions (such as leaving hospital, moving to independent living, 
trying to return to work) affects individuals differently, influencing sense of well-
being (Gracey & Ownsworth, 2012) and research has indicated that this is linked with 
self-concept. Adjustment to ABI has been investigated and conceptualised within a 
bio-psycho-social framework, broadly proposing that post-injury adjustment is related 
to the interaction between the neuropathology of the brain injury, personal factors, 
psychological factors, and the social and environmental context (Ownsworth, 
Fleming, Desbois, Strong, & Kuipers, 2006; Williams & Evans, 2003). Some factors 
that have been found to contribute to a poorer post-injury adjustment are the use of 
avoidant coping strategies and external locus of control (Dawson, Schwartz, Winocur, 
& Stuss, 2007; Moore & Stambrook, 1992), reduced levels of social support 
(Vogenthaler, Smith, & Goldfader, 1989) and personal factors such as personality, 
coping skills and appraisal of their situation (Rutterford & Wood, 2006). Furthermore, 
it has been suggested that adjustment following an ABI is not a process of arriving at a 
set, static point of recovery, but instead a continuous and cyclical process 
(Muenchberger, Kendall, & Neal, 2008; Newsome & Kendall, 1996). 
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1.7 Self-Discrepancy and its Application to ABI 
 Our self-concept has an important influence on our behaviours and emotional 
responses, and struggling with our own self-representation following ABI can be 
implicated in the subsequent experiences of emotional distress and disorders 
(Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984; Vickery, Gontkovsky, & Caroselli, 2005). The concept 
of self-discrepancy has become more apparent in this adjustment/coping literature, 
with Self-Discrepancy Theory (SDT) opening up as one attempt at explaining this 
process. It states that people compare themselves to an internalised standard called a 
‘self-guide’, and emotional discomfort emerges when there is a contradictory gap 
between these two representations (Higgins, 1987). This emotional discomfort then 
acts as a motivator to reduce the felt disparity between these two comparisons 
(Higgins, 1987). Working within this understanding, motivation towards rehabilitation 
goals is dependent on how consistent these goals are with our current ‘self’ (Vickery 
et al., 2005). This theory postulates three domains of the self, which includes the 
‘actual’, ‘ought’ and ‘ideal’ (Higgins, 1987). The ‘ought’ and ‘ideal’ self subsequently 
motivate people to change or improve, and it has been said that the ideal-self focuses 
on the presence or absence of positive outcomes, whereas the ought-self focuses on 
the presence or absence of negative outcomes (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 
1994). 
It has been suggested SDT has direct implications for treatment of emotional 
disorders, (Cantor et al., 2005); it proposes that affective disorders can be partly due to 
a discrepancy between self-concept (the current, actual self) and these self-guides (the 
ideal and ought selves). As these discrepancies increase, so will an individual’s 
vulnerability to anxiety or depression, predicting that discrepancies between 
actual/ideal self-states are associated with depression, and discrepancies between 
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actual/ought self-states are associated with anxiety (Cantor et al., 2005; Higgins, 1987; 
Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985). There have been some studies investigating these 
ideas, some supporting these predictions (Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Strauman, 1992) and 
some finding negative or mixed results (Bruch, Rivet, & Laurenti, 2000; Ozgul, 
Heubeck, Ward, & Wilkinson, 2003; Tangney, Nedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998; 
Weilage & Hope, 1999).  
There has been one research study which has specifically expanded SDT into 
the realm of TBI. Cantor et al. (2005) used this theory as a way of trying to understand 
and explain elements of depression and anxiety post injury in a TBI population, in that 
a discrepancy between your actual and ideal self would result in depression, and a 
discrepancy between actual and ought self would result in anxiety. The authors found 
a strong correlation between increased affective distress in participants and greater 
self-discrepancy between past and current self. However, this pilot study did not 
support the hypothesis specific to SDT, that discrepancies between actual/ideal selves 
are related to depression, and discrepancies between actual/ought selves are related to 
anxiety. This may be partly due to the smaller sample size, however, the particular 
methodology used to examine ‘self’ in the paper was considered as a potential limiting 
factor by the authors; as by using an open ended interview, those with brain injury 
may have struggled to generate meaningful information about ‘self’ in the more 
abstract sense of ‘ought’ and ‘ideal’ (Cantor et al., 2005). One other possibility is that 
‘Ought’ self is a concept which may also be hard to disentangle from an ‘ideal’ self in 
this context. Furthermore, research has found that a patient’s sense of self is not a 
static concept, but influenced by their progress within rehabilitation and recovery.  For 
example, Kristensen (2004) found that prior to the start of rehabilitation, individuals 
were more concerned with striving to maintain the ‘former self’, whereas afterwards 
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there is more of a focus on ‘self-realisation’ and making adjustments to their current 
self. Therefore, the time since injury/stage of rehabilitation may determine whether 
affective difficulties related to self have an impact upon a survivor, which wasn’t 
considered within this study. Cantor et al. (2005) noted that there is a need for further 
research in the use of this model in brain injury following their pilot study.   
1.8 Literature Review 
 The comorbidity of emotional difficulties following an acquired brain injury 
has been investigated quite substantially, with consistently elevated levels of distress 
being found (e.g., Broomfield, Quinn, Abdul-Rahim, Walters, & Evans, 2014; Fann, 
Burington, Leonetti, Jaffe, Katon, & Thompson, 2004; Kim et al, 2007). However, 
research is now moving towards examining the after effects of this distress, with 
recent growth in interest around trying to identify the emotional adjustment, 
rehabilitation and re-conceptualisation of a person’s identity following a brain injury 
(Gracey & Ownsworth, 2008). The most obvious conclusion to draw is that there is a 
negative recognition that the person’s past self has been replaced, with limitations that 
were not present beforehand (Moldover et al, 2004). However, there are reports that 
positive sense of self can emerge following a brain injury, with reference to resilience 
and overcoming adversity (Sabat, Moodley, & Kathard, 2006), acting as a catalyst for 
personal growth (Ownsworth & Fleming, 2011), so clarification of the literature is 
justified.  
 Furthermore, Gracey, Evans and Malley (2009) in their Y-Shaped model, point 
towards sense of self being a core feature of the development of threat appraisal 
behaviours and subsequent coping behaviours. In order to gain a better perspective on 
this element of adjustment and to develop an understanding of how ‘self’ is 
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conceptualised following a brain injury, this review aims to address the following 
question: “what is the impact of an ABI on self-identity?”  
1.8.1 Search strategy.   
 A systematic search of the literature was conducted on 25
th
 November 2014 
using three electronic databases: CINAHL Complete, MEDLINE Complete and 
PsychINFO. A priori limits were set to papers investigating adult, human populations, 
published in English and in peer-reviewed journals. The keywords for relevant 
returned items were examined to ensure that appropriate synonyms of the search terms 
had been utilised and, where appropriate, mapped to subject terms specific to the 
database. This was supplemented by identifying further relevant articles from 
reference lists of articles already included, from review articles, and by hand-
searching key journals in the field (Brain Injury and Neuropsychological 
Rehabilitation). Literature were searched from the first year that these journals were 
available and search terms were truncated using ‘*’ as needed. The following search 
string was used:  
 
1. Brain Injur* OR Head Injur* OR Stroke* 
2. Identit* OR Self* OR Selves* OR Sense of self 
3. 1 AND 2 
 
1.8.2 Selection process. 
 All abstracts were examined to determine suitability for inclusion in the review, 
and full text articles were obtained if they appeared to meet selection criteria. Figure 2 
provides a summary of the search process. Journal articles were considered for 
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inclusion if they were original research looking at identity or self-concept in 
individuals with ABI. Articles were excluded if they were not in English, not from 
peer-reviewed journals (meetings, conference papers or dissertation) or were 
review/purely theoretical articles which did not report new findings. Case studies were 
included if they met sufficient methodological strength for a single case experimental 
design (Tate, McDonald, Perdices, Togher, Schultz & Savage, 2008). Intervention 
studies focusing on rehabilitation of self-identity/self-concept were also excluded in 
this search following review, as the literature search revealed that an upcoming 
systematic review was due to be published on this subject (Ownsworth & Haslam, 
2014). 
1.8.3 Selection of papers. 
The search revealed 264 results, and five additional papers were identified 
through ancestry search methodology. After duplicates were removed and 
titles/abstracts were screened in accordance with inclusion/exclusion criteria, 21 
studies remained for review (see table 1 and 2 for list of studies). 
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Figure 2. CONSORT flow diagram for the literature review process 
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Table 1. 
Summary Of Qualitative Studies Included In the Literature Review    
 
Authors 
Sample size, sex 
(F/M), diagnosis 
Age range Methodology used Key themes/narratives identified around self-identity 
Cloute, Mitchelle & Yates (2008) 6 (male = 5) TBI 22 – 60 Semi structured interview – 
discourse analysis 
Medical model referencing 
dependence as intrinsic to TBI 
TBI as deficit 
Progression and productivity as key life-defining features 
 
Douglas (2013) 
 
20 (male = 16) TBI 21 – 54 Qualitative interviews – 
grounded theory approach 
Who I am 
How I feel about myself 
Staying connected 
 
Ellis-Hill, Payne, & Ward (2000) 
 
8 (male = 5) Stroke 
 
56 – 82 Life narrative interviews All respondents reported a fundamental change in their lives and identity, with a 
split between themselves and their body.  
Gelech & Deshardins (2011) 4 (gender data not 
available) ABI 
Not available Semi structured interviews – 
thematic, syntactic and deep 
structure analysis 
Whilst many of the themes were around the dominant discourse of ‘lost or 
shattered self’, there were aspects of stability, recovery, transcendence and moral 
growth in the process of reconstructing self following brain injury.  
 
Gracey, Palmer, Rous, Psaila, Shaw, 
O’Dell, Cope &Mohamed (2008) 
32 (male = 23) ABI 21 – 59 Structured group discussion 
– thematic analysis of 
elicited personal constructs 
Experience of self in the world                Basic skills 
Experience of self in relation to self        Coping/outlook 
Emotions                                                  Social relating 
Activity                                                    Motivation              Uncertainty 
 
Guise, McKinlay & Widdicombe (2010) 12 patients, 5 carers 
-  Stroke 
Under 55  Focus group interviews – 
discourse analysis  
Participants had sensitivities about acquiring a ‘damaged’ sense of self, and 
attempted to mitigate these experiences. 
 
Kvigne, Kirkevold & Gjengedal (2010) 20 (all female) 
Stroke 
31 – 80 Interviews – descriptive 
phenomenological method 
There was a lengthy struggle to continue life and preserve the old self following a 
stroke, with significant loss associated with pre-held female/family roles. 
 
Lennon, Bramham, Carroll, McElligott, 
Carton, Waldron, Fortune, Burke, Fizhenry 
& Benson (2014) 
 
9 (male = 8) TBI ABI: 28 - 62 
 
Interview – interpretative 
thematic analysis 
There were both positive and negative self-narratives around reconstruction of 
self following brain injury. Sense of self was described as simultaneously 
continuous and changing. 
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Table 1.  
Summary Of Qualitative Studies Included In the Literature Review    
 
Authors 
Sample size, sex (F/M), 
diagnosis 
Age range Methodology used Key themes/narratives identified around self-identity 
Muenchberger, Kendall & 
Neal (2008) 
6 (male = 4) TBI 22 – 49 Interpretive qualitative 
phenomenological method 
Identity transition is characterized by an individualised dynamic process between 
positive and negative experiences, a struggle for equilibrium and resolution of these 
tensions. 
  
Nochi (1997) 4 (male = 3) TBI 24 – 40 In-depth interviewing and 
participant observation 
Participants felt that they were carrying a ‘void’ in their understanding of their past and 
present, which was filled with stories. TBI appears as meanings in self-narratives rather 
than an objective truth. 
 
Nochi (1998a) 
 
10 (male = 6) TBI 24 – 49 Grounded theory Participants experience loss of self in various forms, although attempt to avoid or 
minimize this sense of loss. They find it difficult to develop clear knowledge of 
becoming their new self, there is a negative comparison to previous self and sense of 
self is threatened by labels that society places upon them.  
 
Nochi (1998b) 
 
10 (male = 8) TBI 24 - 54 In-depth interviewing and 
grounded theory 
A loss of self is experienced when participants interact with society and are labelled by 
them, as they contradict the individual’s self-definition. Strategies are devised to 
maintain a shared meaning of self in society.   
 
Nochi (2000) 10 (male = 8) TBI 27 – 54 In-depth interviewing and 
participant observation 
the self better than others 
the grown self 
the recovering self 
the self living here and now 
the protesting self 
 
Pallesen (2014) 15 (male = 10) Stroke 42 – 84 phenomenological qualitative 
method 
In managing changes to self-identity, they seemed to be in a continuous process of 
change that never truly stabilized. Participants coped with this with resignation or 
personal growth. 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Table 2. 
Summary Of Quantitative Studies Included In the Literature Review    
 
Authors 
Sample size, sex 
(F/M), diagnosis 
Age range 
Type of assessment (self-
concept) 
Key findings around self-identity  
Carroll & Coetzer (2011) 29 (male = 21) TBI 22 – 64 HISDS (version III) Participants reported significant changes in self-concept, current self viewed 
negatively in comparison to pre-injury self. Identity change was also associated 
with depression, grief, low self-esteem and low awareness.  
 
Doering, Conrad, Rief & 
Exner (2011) 
35 (male = 21) ABI Mean age 44 FSCS Compared to normative measures, all scales of ‘self-concept of achievement’ were 
evaluated more negatively. No difference found between ‘feeling respected by 
others’ and ‘irritability by others’ 
 
Ellis-Hill & Horn (2000) 26 (male = 16) 
Stroke 
50 – 83 HISDS (version II) Participants described themselves more negatively than prior to their stroke on most 
constructs measured.  
 
Jones, Haslam, Jetten, 
Williams, Morris & Saroyan 
(2011) 
630 (male = 384) 
ABI 
9 – 81 TREAT-Q  A relationship was found between worse injury and better reported life satisfaction, 
with identity strength being a strong mediator, alongside personal and social 
changes.  
 
Ponsford, Kelly & 
Couchman (2014) 
41 (male = 29) TBI 18 – 73 TSCS Participants with TBI rated significantly lower levels of self-concept compared to 
control. Self-concept was also associated with depressive symptoms and anxiety.  
 
Tyerman & Humphrey 
(1984) 
25 (male = 23) TBI 17 – 34 HISDS (version I) Participants reported having changed substantially due to their head injury, and this 
was associated with poorer ratings on a wide variety of constructs. 
 
Vickery, Gontkovsky & 
Caroselli (2005) 
19 (male = 13) 
ABI 
19 – 57 HISDS (version I); TSCS 
 
Poorer self-concept ratings were associated with lower subjective quality of life and 
higher affective distress.  
Note:  ABI = Acquired Brain Injury; FSCS = Frankfurt self-concept scale; HISDS = Head Injury Semantic Differential Scale; TBI = Traumatic Brain Injury; TREAT-Q = 
Trauma and Recovery Experiences assessment Tool Questionnaire; TSCS = Tennessee self-concept scale 
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1.8.4 Results and characteristics of the studies. 
 The studies found were a mixture of qualitative studies (14) and quantitative 
studies (7), with a wide range of methodologies and measures used throughout the 
literature. Overall the studies covered a large heterogeneous sample of participants (N 
= 972) aged between 9 and 84 (although there may be some crossover of participants 
between studies), including ABI and TBI populations, (with a predominance of TBI 
only samples - 12 studies), with a wide mixture of genders, ethnicities and time since 
injury.  
 1.8.5 Quantitative studies. 
 Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) used the Head Injury Semantic Differential 
Scale (HISDS) to examine the discrepancy between past and present self in 25 
participants with TBI, providing a quantitative measurement of perceived loss and 
change in identity.  They found that 72% of participants declared that they had 
changed significantly as a person, with the majority of changes being seen as negative. 
However, there were also instances of positive conceptions as well (feeling more 
mature, responsible, understanding and appreciative). These authors also discussed the 
notion that the participants’ identity before their injury was particularly important to 
them, with many believing and hoping that they would return to the level of their pre-
morbid functioning. They argued that whilst this was initially a motivating factor for 
recovery in the short term, when these are found to be unrealistic goals this negative 
comparison can become a constraint to both rehabilitation and long term adjustment. 
 Carrol and Coetzer (2011) also examined self-concept using the HISDS 
(version III) in a TBI sample of 29 participants, finding that present self was regarded 
negatively in comparison to pre-injury self on many different attributes (e.g., less 
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happy, satisfied and hopeful), with those individuals who reported the largest change 
in self-concept more likely to report a much poorer adjustment to difficulties. 
 Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) also used this measure in a population of 26 people 
recovering from a stroke, and, again, rated their present self-concept as similar or 
more negative than their past self on every aspect assessed (apart from seeing 
themselves as more caring), rating themselves as less capable, independent, satisfied, 
interested, active, confident, of less value and less in control as compared to before. 
The authors also speak about one participant who was severely disabled, who 
explained that she saw her old life before the stroke as having ended, and that she was 
beginning a new life. 
 Two papers which also examined self-concept as a smaller element within 
their studies. Vickery et al. (2005) used the HISDS in a sample of 19 participants who 
had sustained an ABI and found that poorer perceived current identity was associated 
with poorer perceived quality of life.  Furthermore, Ponsford, Kelly and Couchman 
(2014) used the Tennessee Self Concept Scale (Fitts & Warren, 1992) in a sample of 
41 participants with TBI, and found that those with a TBI rated significantly lower 
levels of self-concept.   
 A German study by Doering, Conrad, Rief and Exner (2011) used the 
Frankfurt Self-Concept Scale (Deusinger, 1986) to assess the attitudes of their 35 
participants who had sustained an ABI and had chronic difficulties as a result, around 
issues concerning their identity. Compared to the measure’s normative data, all scales 
of ‘self-concept of achievement’ were evaluated more negatively, again supporting the 
assumption of a more negative self-concept. However, looking at psychosocial aspects 
the authors found that there were no differences between ‘feeling respected by others’ 
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and ‘irritability by others’, again indicating that not all areas of self-concept may be 
affected by ABI.  
 Finally, Jones et al. (2011) used a self-developed questionnaire called the 
Trauma and Recovery Experiences Assessment Tool and examined responses from 
630 individuals with ABI, looking at areas related to personal and social change, and 
life satisfaction following their accident. They found that counter-intuitively, more 
severe ABI was associated with a strengthening of personal identity and life 
satisfaction post-injury, suggesting that those with more severe difficulties are more 
likely to do significant “identity work” (Jones et al., 2011; p. 12) post injury, such as 
strengthening social networks post-injury. This may parallel the results identified by 
Doering et al. (2011) who found that chronic difficulties were associated with a 
negative sense of self. Jones et al. (2011) suggested that there was capacity for 
personal and social factors to buffer the negative effects of the severity, with both 
factors being strengthened through working through their image, which may explain 
the difference.  
 Furthermore, the well-being of the participants in the Jones et al. (2011) study 
was positively related to their personal identity following brain injury; their sense that 
they were ‘survivors’ and stronger as a result of their injury was associated with 
greater life satisfaction overall. This study also found that the relationship between 
injury severity and life satisfaction was mediated by the number of improved 
relationships post-injury. The authors felt that this may be partly due to the severity of 
the injury, influencing the support services that patients received. They noted that this 
was consistent with the idea of personal identity strength being built largely through 
social relationships, and that access to these groups appears to be integral to the 
effective management of injury. This may be because these groups provide a source of 
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important emotional support and practical resources, providing benefits to those 
individuals. Additionally, the authors hypothesised that cultivating an identity around 
being a survivor rather than a victim may help individuals to derive strength from their 
injury, and help them make sense of their experienced changes to self.  
 1.8.6 Evaluation of findings: Quantitative studies 
As the studies reviewed comprised of correlational and quasi-experimental 
research, literature on critical appraisal of quantitative methodologies was used to 
guide the evaluation. Two generic frameworks for critical appraisal (Crombie, 1996; 
Jack, Hayes, Scharalda, Stetson, Jones-Jack, Valliere, Kirchain, Fagen & LeBlanc, 
2010) were applied. These criteria are presented in table 3, and the summary table of 
comparison criterion are presented in table 4.  
The majority of studies chose a title and abstract which provided immediate 
insight and information into the research, with Jones et al. (2011) being excluded due 
to its lack of immediacy and the vagueness of its terms. All introductions managed to 
succinctly present the literature leading up to the study, with much of the prior 
research overlapping as referenced throughout each other’s papers. All authors were 
then able to subsequently justify the rationale or gap in the literature that their study 
aimed to contribute to, such as through a specific type of injury (e.g. stroke; Ellis-Hill 
& Horn, 2000) or to examine whether specific concepts are related (e.g. self-concept 
and quality of life/affective distress; Vickery et al., 2005).  
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Table 3.  
Criteria for Assessing Quantitative Methodological Quality in Quantitative Studies, 
Adapted from Crombie (1996) and Jack et al. (2010). 
Criterion Details 
Title and Abstract 1. Does it provide immediate insight into the research 
2. Does the abstract provide the reader with key information 
Introduction 3. Does the manuscript provide a succinct presentation of 
previously published literature and offer a rationale for the 
study 
Method: Sample  4. Was the sample size sufficient?   
5. Were calculations reported? 
6. Were inclusion/exclusion criteria explicitly reported? 
7. Were age/gender described? 
8. Were severity/chronicity of illness described? 
9. Was the control group (if used) appropriate? 
Method: 
Measurement 
10. Were suitable measures used? 
11. Were psychometric properties reported? 
Results/Statistical 
analysis 
12. Were statistical methods appropriate? 
13. Were assumptions of the method met? 
14. Were descriptive statistics described? 
15. Was statistical significance reported? 
Discussion 16. Does it adequately summarise main results and findings 
17. Have potential biases/confounding been controlled for? 
18. Are generalisability of results discussed? 
19. Are the limitations discussed? 
20. What are the implications or recommendations for 
education/ clinical practice? 
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Table 4. 
Summary Of Quantitative Studies Assessed for Methodological Quality, Using Questions Adapted from Crombie (1996) and Jack et al. (2010). 
 
 
Authors             Criterion Number 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
 
Carroll & Coetzer (2011) 
 
        -           
 
Doering, Conrad, Rief & Exner  
(2011) 
 
        -           
Ellis-Hill & Horn (2000) 
 
                   
 
Jones, Haslam, Jetten, Williams, 
Morris & Saroyan (2011) 
        -           
 
Ponsford, Kelly & Couchman 
(2014) 
                   
 
Tyerman & Humphrey (1984) 
 
        -           
Vickery, Gontkovsky & Caroselli 
(2005)  

 
      -           
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The aforementioned research studies seemed to suffer from some similar 
limitations which have implications for their generalisability to the wider population, 
such as smaller sample sizes and possible inadequate statistical power (Carrol & 
Coetzer, 2011; Doering, Conrad and Yates,2011; Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Ponsford, 
et al., 2014; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984). The studies were forthcoming in 
commenting on this (with none reporting any previous calculations for the appropriate 
sample size to reach adequate power). Interestingly, small sample size is a critique 
levelled more generally at research in brain injury (Carroll, Cassidy, Holm, Kraus, & 
Coronado, 2004). The exception to this was Jones et al. (2011), which had a 
questionnaire sample of 630 individuals with ABI, although the authors felt there may 
be issues of self-selection around those who were willing to respond to the 
questionnaire (and may have had more positive outcomes). 
All quantitative papers described their sampling methods appropriately, 
outlining age ranges and genders of their samples, with inclusion and exclusion 
criteria made explicitly clear in all but two papers (Carrol & Coetzer, 2011; Jones et 
al., 2011). Not all of the papers outlined the specifics around severity of injuries, with 
some descriptives such as “mild, moderate or severe” (e.g. Vickery et al., 2005), 
whereas some used more standardised tools and measures, such as the Glasgow coma 
scale (Carrol & Coetzer, 2011). Some papers targeted specific severity populations, 
with Carrol and Coetzer (2011) indicating that their participants were on the more 
‘able’ or ‘well’ end of the injury severity spectrum, again raising issues of 
generalisability of results to other studies. Similarly, Doering, Conrad and Yates 
(2011) noted that their sample comprised of participants seeking treatment for chronic 
difficulties following ABI, and so it may be assumed that they are having ongoing 
adaptation problems long after their injury, and so may be characterised by especially 
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negative self-concept, which should be kept in mind when considering these results. 
Only two studies used a control group (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Ponsford, et al., 
2014) and both were appropriate, attempting to match them with the ABI groups. 
The measures used were predominantly well suited to the population, with 
measures such as the HISDS commonly used which was developed for use in brain 
injury populations (Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984). The HISDS allows the participant 
to rate themselves compared to a pre-injury self as a way of examining change in self-
concept, however these samples only examined the discrepancy between pre-injury 
self and current self, not examining the current and ideal discrepancy (Carroll & 
Coetzer, 2011; Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984; Vickery, et al., 
2005). However, Vickery et al. (2005) and Ponsford et al. (2014) (alongside Doering, 
Conrad and Yates (2011) using the Frankfurt self-concept scale) did not use any 
personalised measurement of prior self as their comparison point, instead relying on 
the generic normative data for the measurement, and Ponsford et al. (2014) and Ellis-
Hill and Horn (2000) used matched control groups. Whilst this demonstrates the 
difference in self-concept in a different way, it limits the conclusions that can be made 
around a person’s self-concept following brain injury, as it is not asking about their 
own individualised self-identity, although this can address some of the difficulties that 
may emerge from using a solely subjective self-reported ratings (see Fadnes, Taube & 
Tylleskär, 2009 for overview of biases).  
However different versions of this measure have been used in different studies 
(Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984; 
Vickery et al., 2005), so this must be considered when directly comparing them. The 
one exception to this is Doering, Conrad and Yates (2011) who used the Frankfurt 
Self-Concept Scale, which the authors reported had only been used in ABI research 
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once before (referencing Gatzweiler, 1996), although Doering, et al. (2011) did 
present preliminary evidence for good convergent validity with the HISDS in their 
own study (= .57) .  
Jones et al. (2011) was also an exception to this by not using a specialist tool 
to measure sense of self. Instead the participants were assessed using single items as 
part of a larger questionnaire (Trauma and Recovery Experiences Assessment Tool), 
meaning that their conclusions can only be considered within broad contexts, as the 
nuances of identity and sense of self were not examined. The authors attempted to 
counter this limitation with research showing that single item measures have been 
found to correlate well with larger measures (referencing Robins, Hendin, & 
Trzesniewski, 2001), although general consensus normally points to single-item scales 
as usually psychometrically inferior to multiple-item scales (Gosling, Rentfrow & 
Swann, 2003).  
All papers used appropriate statistical methodology, and where appropriate, 
assumptions for methodology such as parametric assessments were indicated where 
these were used. All studies also reported descriptive statistics and whether or not 
their analyses were statistically significant. All of the papers were able to adequately 
summarise the main results and findings, however very few controlled for biases and 
confounds, with only Jones et al (2011) and Ponsford et al. (2014) addressing these, 
controlling for other mediating factors and education respectively.  
The limitations and generalisability of their research was a topic discussed 
much more consistently throughout the research, with Doering et al. (2011) failing to 
discuss the generalisability of their results, and Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) 
discussing neither of these, using their discussion to talk about the implications of 
their study for participants and for their measure of self-discrepancy. All of the studies 
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collected for this literature review discussed implications and recommendations for 
future practice and research.     
1.8.7 Findings from quantitative studies: The impact of an ABI on self-
identity. 
 The results of the quantitative studies seemed to overwhelmingly present the 
idea of a negative self-concept as compared to the pre-injury self, in regards to their 
functioning, abilities and often their characteristics and personality. The exception to 
this was Jones et al. (2011), which, whilst having limitations, found some mediating 
factors which revealed protective factors in redeveloping identity following brain 
injury.  For example, the severities of the injuries were associated with better sense of 
self and life satisfaction, mediated by personal and social factors. This may be due to 
the support they received from others as a result of their injury.  The findings of an 
overall negative sense of self may be a result of the use of quantitative methodology 
and scales, which focused overwhelmingly on a comparison to past self or specific 
affective disorders, rather than a focus on a future identity. This may not give the 
appropriate space to explore the complexities of this area, and this ‘comparison’ may 
encourage a more negative evaluation that qualitative methodologies do not.  
 1.8.8 Qualitative studies 
  Muenchberger, Kendall, and Neal (2008) used an Interpretive 
Phenomenological Approach (Smith, 1996) to explore the meaning of six TBI 
survivors’ experiences. They found that identity adjustment following TBI was a 
dynamic, cyclical journey, comprising a constant interplay between positive and 
negative experiences, a struggle for equilibrium and for resolution of these tensions. 
Participants described the post-injury phase as one of partial acceptance and trying to 
reclaim identity, reflecting on their past selves, focusing on a medicalised illness 
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narrative and a shrinking of previous identity. The return to pre-injury environments 
was a trigger point for comparison with their pre-injury self, and as a result these 
problem situations were avoided. This constriction of activity and the fear of failure 
they experienced was then found to place them in a position of feeling ‘dependant’ on 
others  and created a fear of ‘not measuring up’ to social expectation, leading to an 
identity shaped by an overwhelming desire to meet societal and normative 
expectations. However a more positive ‘expansion of identity’ theme also emerged, in 
that brain injury represented a ‘second chance’ at life and heightened their motivation 
to focus on short-term opportunities and kept them appreciative of life and working 
towards purposeful goals. The paper stated that it also gave them the opportunity to be 
perceived as an individual again, rather than a collective (i.e., “people with brain 
injuries” p. 987).  
 Cloute, Mitchelle and Yates (2008) identified a series of themes using 
Discourse Analysis (Schiffrin, Tannen & Hamilton, 2003), exploring the co-
construction of identity for those with six survivors following TBI. They identified 
four themes; medical model reference; dependence as intrinsic to TBI; TBI as deficit 
and progression and productivity as key life-defining features. The most prominent of 
these seemed to be ‘TBI as deficit’, which included repertoires around an idealised 
past, the person as a victim/physically impaired, socially and functionally deficient, 
and an idealised lost potential future. Alongside this was a ‘medical model’ theme that 
also emerged in the aforementioned Muenchberger, et al. (2008) paper which reported 
a feeling of abandonment and a requirement for reliance on health services. The theme 
around ‘dependence as intrinsic to TBI’, outlined how there was a reliance on 
significant others and lack of independence being a key life defining feature, although 
there was less elaboration on this in the study itself. 
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 Douglas (2013) aimed to explore the ways in which 20 adults who had 
sustained severe to very severe TBI viewed themselves several years after their 
injuries, using a Grounded Theory methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This paper 
establishes themes around “who I am”, “how I feel about myself” and “staying 
connected”.  Part of “Who I am” included striving statements, capturing the goals that 
survivors wanted, where injury consequences were more apparent and were reflected 
on, alongside difficulties in social relations and activities.  There was also the 
emergence of the ‘self as a burden’, especially in relation to family members and the 
associated guilt that came from this perception. However many reflected on being 
more content post-injury, feeling that they were getting better/stronger and feeling 
more positive about the future. In addition to this, it became evident that many of the 
participants saw themselves as much more altruistic, with a greater focus on living in 
the present and feeling fortunate by comparison. Furthermore, a sense that framing the 
injury in this way gave validation to the process of identifying new, fulfilling goals for 
the survivors, similar to the themes emerging in Muenchberger, et al’s (2008) study.  
  Similarly to themes found in Cloute et al. (2008), Gelech and Deshardins 
(2011) found in their sample of four ABI survivors, that the patient’s accident altered 
the relative value associated with some of the roles which had been lost post injury 
(e.g., employed/married), and so were no longer seen as necessary for their happiness 
or selfness; transforming what initially appears as a loss to the self into a gain. The 
authors reported that personhood was deemed to have remained largely intact through 
the injury experience, whilst simultaneously increasing compassion, patience and 
respect of life, rather than being dominated by grief and loss. They also reported that 
many discussions were in accordance with a dominant discourse of ‘lost or shattered 
self”, focusing on negative alterations and losses. They found that this was related to 
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both the changes in the practical consequences of the injury (decrease in practical 
competencies, cognitive abilities and autonomy) and the responses from others around 
them. The authors elaborated on the power of others, explaining that ‘self’ depends 
heavily on relationships with others and the social world.  
 Ellis-Hill, Payne and Ward (2000) examined the self in relation to eight 
participant’s experiences of their own body following a stroke. All of the respondents 
described that their lives had undergone a change that could be likened to entering a 
new foreign world which, when realised as a more permanent change, is challenging 
to the survivors’ identity. Individuals spoke about tasks which made them realise how 
they had taken their body for granted, and that suddenly this had become something 
that was completely out of control for them, as bodies became perplexing to them. The 
authors drew on ideas that body and self are normally seen to be inseparable, and that 
a sense of self is created through the relationship of the body with the external world 
(Leder, 1990; Merleau-Ponty, 1963). Furthermore, the authors described  the self-
body relationship as not being static or gradually improving, but dynamic and 
situation dependant, which draws a parallel with Muenchberger et al’s (2008) thoughts 
of TBI as a dynamic process between positive and negative experiences.   
 Pallesen (2014) used phenomenological qualitative interviews to examine self-
identity following a stroke in 15 people, and found similar themes to Ellis-Hill, Payne 
and Ward (2000) emerged around an unreliable and “forcibly present” body (p. 235), 
leading to an unpleasantness in how their body was experienced. There were also 
discussions around anxiety about coping with their level of functioning, and that their 
body was now experienced as far more vulnerable, “aged in functioning” (p. 5) and a 
reduced trust in their body. These participants also spoke of the effect of injury on 
relationships, bringing up themes which had already been explored in previous papers 
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(Gelech & Deshardins, 2011; Jones et al., 2011), talking about how relationships were 
disrupted and social contacts diminished over, although some spoke of the supportive 
role that friends and family had played in the rehabilitation process. Furthermore, a 
theme of growth or change emerged from some of the survivors, generating a range of 
ways of dealing with difficulties: becoming more flexible in problem solving, 
enduring, will power and active ways of confronting their newly acquired difficulties, 
despite the constant struggle. The authors reflected on how symptoms of participant 
amnesia/cognitive difficulties may have influenced the answers, and that in some 
cases, a family member was occasionally present, which may have led to a ‘negotiated 
narrative’ when they couldn’t agree on events.  
 One paper which also explored the struggle following stroke was Kvigne, 
Kirkevold and Gjengedal (2004), who investigated how 20 female stroke survivors 
experienced their life following a first-time stroke. They found that the participants 
struggled to continue life in familiar ways, and were unable to preserve their former 
lives and previous self.  They felt that the suddenness of a stroke thrust them into a 
role of being acutely ill, characterised by vulnerability and exhausting and 
overwhelming feelings of shock, confusion, shame, guilt and grief. However, this was 
also accompanied by contradictory feelings of hope and a strong will to live, leading 
to conflict around feelings, whilst attempting to strengthen positives. This loss of self 
was felt strongly within their ‘role’ as housewives, many encountering substantial 
difficulties in completing standard tasks, although demonstrating a strong will to 
develop new routines and strategies to accept new ways of doing things. This 
exploration of the self within the family, and the loss of important central positions 
underlined the importance of the reactions of others in the self following ABI, with 
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many survivors willing to go to considerable lengths to maintain a ‘normal’ life for 
their husbands. 
 Lennon et al. (2014) examined the reconstruction of self in nine ABI survivors 
as compared to spinal cord injury and also found negative themes emerging from their 
participants. Considering only those with ABI, individuals described a negative view 
of self, feeling defined by their injury or their functional impairments. There were also 
descriptions of self narratives related to their inability to continue with identity-related 
roles, loss of autonomy and a poor comparison to their pre-injured selves. Again, 
positive aspects of self following brain injury also emerged, finding that these seemed 
to fall into two types, the first being positive self-attributes that developed from the 
experience. Those with ABI found that the experience contributed something positive 
to their sense of self, describing new skills as a consequence of their experience, such 
as finding ways around difficulties. There were also quotes from survivors, feeling 
that their injury helped them to become a stronger person, making them calmer, open-
minded and more at ease with themselves as a person. As also identified in other 
papers in this review, the authors found that those with ABI had facilitated a re-
evaluation of their life priorities, and were more appreciative of their lives. The 
second sub-theme identified strategies that promoted a positive self-reconstruction, 
such as now engaging in meaningful activity and trying to engage more with other 
people through activities such as returning to work. 
 Guise, McKinlay and Widdicombe (2010) used Discourse Analysis (Schiffrin, 
Tannen & Hamilton, 2003) to examine the language used by 12 young stroke 
survivors and their carers in focus groups. They found that participants seemed to be 
sensitive about having acquired a potentially ‘damaged’ sense of self, and despite 
clearly identifying it as a serious life event, many minimised these experiences. They 
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seemed to take into account the carers who were present, minimising the negative 
inferences that others might make of them as stroke sufferers. The authors drew a 
comparison to Ellis-Hill, Payne, and Ward (2000), contrasting that their participants 
did not talk about a disrupted view of self, but the minimisation of negative 
experiences was seen as implying a sense of stigma around being a stroke survivor.  
 The study by Gracey et al. (2008) incorporated Personal Construct 
methodology (Kelly, 1955) and qualitative research methods as a way of 
understanding and conceptualising the experiences of self after ABI in 32 individuals. 
This methodology allowed the development of dichotomous constructs to help 
interpret people’s experience and sense making, encouraging the comparison of pre-
injury, current and ideal selves to identify these constructs. They identified nine 
themes which suggested that following an ABI, individuals make sense of themselves 
in terms of both subjective experience and activity together. A high proportion of the 
developed constructs fell under a broad “experience of self in the world” theme, which 
looked at activities, skills, confidence and a sense of belonging. Second to this, many 
of the constructs were placed under the heading of “basic skills”, suggesting that in 
line with many of the other papers examined in this review, changes in ability 
compared to pre-injury self were also important to this participant group in coming to 
terms with their post injury self. The other themes of ‘experience of self in relation to 
self’, ‘coping/outlook’, ‘emotions’, ‘social relating’, ‘activity’ and ‘motivation’ all 
generate poles which demonstrate the complexity inherent in construction of self 
following brain injury. 
 The final papers identified in this review examining self-identity within ABI 
populations were all completed by Nochi (1997; 1998a; 1998b; 2000). Nochi (1997) 
conducted interviews to evaluate understanding of self following injuries in four 
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individuals, with themes in this paper focusing around ‘the void’, which one of the 
participants used to refer to a blank period in the past memory, but more generally, the 
‘unknown’ that people with TBI encounter when they try to understand themselves 
and their loss of self. The author hypothesised that whilst this loss of self can be 
attributable to the consequences of physical and cognitive functioning after sustaining 
ABI, it is not limited to this. This void can also impact on their past, making it 
difficult to build a narrative around themselves, creating a missing link in the narrative 
of their sense of self and feeling lost in their present self, affecting their self-esteem 
based on their current abilities and ‘failures’. 
 In Nochi’s (1998a) paper, Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was 
used to expand on these previous themes, identifying a similar sense of uncertainty 
and loss, around self and interpretations of the past and future in ten individuals. 
These were often due to the ‘memory blanks’ from the brain injury which impacted on 
how they understood their current situation and generated a comparison to a past sense 
of self (a sense of ‘not who I was’). The paper noted that whilst people experience loss 
of self in many different ways, they also subsequently develop strategies to avoid or 
minimise their sense of loss, by using metaphors, neurological terms, or by keeping a 
narrative/story around hope of recovery, believing that this negative self-image is a 
temporary one which will be replaced by the pre-injury self. This minimisation 
strategy was also seen in Guise et al. (2010), although this was in relation to 
protecting others. Nochi also found a loss of self in the eyes of others, that the 
message they received from others was something that they themselves did not believe 
themselves to be. This led to a sense of ‘classifying’ the individuals, pressing 
pathological or negative labels upon them, affecting their sense of individual self.  
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 This labelling as a threat to loss of self was further explored by Nochi (1998b), 
examining ten participants with TBI. It emerged that those with TBI are sensitive to 
societal messages about who they are, and that these messages often contradict their 
self-definitions, making them feel misunderstood by others and further underlining a 
loss of their own self. These messages are often grouped and labelled around an image 
of abnormality, powerlessness or sickness, furthering the idea that they are different 
and removed from their old identity prior to their injury, and have lost their selves in 
society. Similarly to his 1998a paper, Nochi also identified that those with a TBI 
develop strategies to manage these negative images, hiding their functional changes 
and attempting to control information about themselves, or even to deny and try to 
change the labels attributed to them.  
 Nochi (2000) examined sense of self in ten individuals with a TBI who were 
coping with their changed lives; a relatively unexamined group within this literature 
review. Several themes emerged from this study, firstly “the self better than others” in 
which the present self is contrasted with worse possibilities, adopting a “things could 
be worse” mentality. This mirrored the studies of Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) and 
Lennon et al. (2014), who also found their participants compared themselves to others 
favourably. “The grown self” emerged as a second category in this paper, reflecting 
on how the experience of TBI had contributed to positive characteristics, acquiring 
insight into themselves or growing from a moralistic point of view (e.g., stopping drug 
taking behaviours).  This paper’s themes mirrored other studies in this review which 
have found elements of post-accident growth and a sense of developing or growing 
stronger following ABI (Douglas, 2013; Gelech & Deshardins, 2011; Jones et al., 
2011; Lennon et al., 2014; Muenchberger et al., 2008). Further themes emerged 
around a “recovering self”, looking at returning towards their pre-injury self, and “the 
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self living here and now”, (trying to restore self-worth without contrasting against pre-
injury selves/others). Finally, some of these narratives were classified under “the 
protesting self”: obtaining a certain image of the world and locating difficulties there, 
instead of within themselves and their injury.  
 1.8.9 Evaluation of findings: Qualitative studies. 
These qualitative studies were considered individually in line with the Critical 
Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP: 2014) framework for qualitative research (see 
table 5), with this framework applied to these papers in table 6. It was found that all 
papers assessed clearly stated the aims of the research, and use appropriate 
methodology to try and reach these aims, with a wide variation in techniques used 
across the studies. These studies used different qualitative techniques to investigate 
these questions around self following brain injury, and it was found that many of the 
papers produced very similar and comparable themes. This helps to strengthen against 
the limitations of the individual papers, in regards to how generalisable they are when 
trying to answer the literature review question.  
Almost all of the papers made a clear statement about the aims of the research, 
the only exception being the papers belonging to Nochi (1997; 1998a; 2000) which 
were often presented as very vague and open in their aim (e.g. ‘…aims to describe the 
experiences of people with TBI from their viewpoints by analysing their self 
narratives’). The use of qualitative methodology was appropriate to answer the authors 
questions, although there were some papers in which multiple methodology was used 
(e.g., Gelech & Desjardins, 2011) and it wasn’t made explicitly clear why multiple 
methods of analysis were chosen, although each one was elaborated on.  
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Table 5. 
Critical Appraisal Skills Programme - Qualitative Appraisal Tool Questions (CASP: 
2014)   
 
1. Was there a clear statement of the aims of the research? 
2. Is a qualitative methodology appropriate? 
3. Was the research design appropriate to address the aims of the research? 
4. Was the recruitment strategy appropriate to the aims of the research 
5. Was the data collected in a way that addressed the research issue? 
6. Has the relationship between researcher and participants been adequately 
considered? 
7. Have ethical issues been taken into consideration? 
8. Was the data analysis sufficiently rigorous? 
9. Is there a clear statement of findings? 
10. How valuable is the research? 
 
Most papers used an appropriate recruitment strategy, with some selecting 
specialist populations to answer their specific questions (Douglas 2013 Kvigne, 
Kirkevold and Gjengedal, 2004; Nochi, 2000). However Muenchberger et al. (2008) 
reported the use of sampling through informal connections in the community.  
Furthermore Nochi (1997) identified and Gelech and Deshardins (2011) asked 
clinicians to identify participants based on whether they would be suited to the 
demands of the interview process and Nochi (1997; 1998a; 1998b) seemed to use 
some of the same participants across studies, some of whom were known to him 
outside a purely professional relationship. These are all acknowledged by the authors, 
and may all introduce the possibility of bias dependant on the researchers view, with 
Nochi (1998a) specifically recruiting those with loss-of-self experiences.  
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Table 6. 
Summary Of Qualitative Studies assessed for methodological quality- Critical Appraisal Skills Programme - Qualitative Appraisal Tool Questions 
 
 
Authors                      Criterion Number 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
 
Cloute, Mitchelle & Yates (2008) 
 
        
Douglas (2013) 
 
        
Ellis-Hill, Payne, & Ward (2008) 
 
        
Gelech & Deshardins (2011) 
 
         
Gracey, et al. (2008) 
 
        
Guise et al. (2010) 
 
         
Kvigne, Kirkevold & Gjengedal (2010) 
 
        
Lennonet al. (2014) 
 
        
Muenchberger, Kendall & Neal (2008) 
 
        
Nochi (1997) 
 
        
Nochi (1998a) 
 
         
Nochi (1998b) 
 
        
Nochi (2000) 
 
        
Pallesen (2014) 
 
        
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Data analysis methods were described in detail for many of the papers, 
however none of these papers spoke about any sort of saturation limits for their data 
(although Douglas, (2013) did discuss a methodology of increasingly clearer themes 
developing as data was analysed), which means that although similar themes were 
drawn from the participants, the extent to which we can judge whether these sample 
sizes were appropriate is limited. This ties into the wider critique of the brain injury 
research literature that sample sizes are generally small and underpowered (Carroll et 
al., 2004). Nochi (1997) was identified as a possible exception to appropriate data 
collection, speaking vaguely about how themes were identified, coded or discarded, 
and although he makes reference to previous literature, his strategy seemed to be very 
personal to him.   
The findings from each of the papers were generally presented clearly, 
although in some papers where there were multiple qualitative methods used to 
generate themes and ideas, these were sometimes confusingly presented, impairing the 
ability to recognise the specific techniques used to generate themes (e.g., Gelech & 
Desjardins, 2011). Furthermore, there was generally less discussion around evidence 
against the researchers’ arguments, predominantly focusing on their own data and 
whether this was found to be supported by other research. There was also little 
discussion around credibility of their findings outside of comparison to other research, 
with issues such as triangulation limited because samples predominantly used brain 
injury patients, except for Cloute, et al. (2008), Ellis-Hill, Payne and Ward, (2008), 
Guise et al. (2010), and Palleson (2014) who also used some carers, but they often 
gave conflicting stories to those with a brain injury.  
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In line with this recognition of the influence of impacting factors, few papers 
spoke about the influence of the researcher, or the impact that this may have on the 
participant. Nochi (1997) was transparent about this relationship and considered the 
potential that this may have had in influencing his results, and Ellis-Hill et al. (2008) 
spoke about the background of the researcher and the assumptions that participants 
may make of her, and how this may have influenced the results. Gracey et al. (2008) 
spoke about social constructionist research, recognising that the researchers theoretical 
and socio-cultural perspective will influence the analysis (although did not explicitly 
relate this back to the impact on the relationship), and Lennon et al (2014) also briefly 
spoke about the influence of researchers views. This consideration was not found in 
any other papers in this review. Very few papers took reported their thoughts or 
considerations around ethical issues, with Gracey et al. (2008) and Guise et al (2010) 
speaking to it briefly, and Palleson (2014) devoting part of their paper to ethical 
consideration within the project.  
All papers described their data analysis techniques in detail and it all seemed 
to be sufficiently rigorous, with some papers , such as Gracey et al. (2008), 
Muenchberger et al. (2008) and Lennon et al. (2014) using methods of inter- rated 
reliability to minimise the influence of potential bias and maximise bias-free coding, 
alongside Nochi (1998a; 1998b) speaking about senior qualitative researchers 
overlooking his themes. When considering or reflecting on other sources of potential 
bias/impacting factors, many of the other papers fell short, with Cloute, Mitchelle and 
Yates (2008) seeming to focus on evaluating a theme around the medical model, to the 
apparent detriment of the other emerging themes in the text. This may reflect a source 
of bias in the researchers, or the narrative that they wanted to put across, however they 
did not reflect on this, which is important since reflexivity is often seen to be integral 
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to qualitative research (Shaw, 2010), and no research is able to fully eliminate error 
and bias (Norris, 1997). Not all papers were able to generate a clear statement of 
findings in their discussion, with those papers (Gelech & Deshardins, 2011; Guise et 
al., 2010; Nochi, 1998a) instead choosing to push directly into implications, theorising 
and concluding thoughts.  
 The final question on which these studies were considered was on how 
valuable this research was, and it seems that this body of literature adds considerably 
to the wider knowledge base. Whilst there is a much larger debate about the nature of 
the knowledge produced by qualitative research and whether it can be legitimately 
judged (Mays & Pope, 2000) such as distrust for not being able to provide a 
generalisable foundation for clinical decisions (Berkwits & Inui, 1998; Jones, 
1995),qualitative methodologies are some of the most effective methods used to 
capture expressive information that is not conveyed in quantitative data, about the 
beliefs, values, feelings and motivations that underlie our behaviour (Berkwits & Inui, 
1998). It takes a stance that begins by accepting that there are a range of different 
ways of making sense of the world, concerned with the meaning of those who are 
researched and understanding their view of the world, rather than those of the clinician 
undertaking the research (Jones, 1995). From this, there is a view that qualitative 
methodologies can encourage participatory or emancipatory research for those in 
oppressed or less powerful positions (such as those with disabilities), allowing 
narratives or experiences which are normally distorted by academic discourse, models 
or ignored entirely to emerge and be heard (Nind, 2008; Oliver, 1997).  
 Whilst qualitative data approaches the problem from a different perspective to 
quantitative data, attempting to understand something in its context and becoming 
immersed in it, compared to the enumeration and measurement of quantitative 
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approaches (which are often seen as more limited) (Abusabha & Woeflel, 2003) they 
can be complementary to each other. Qualitative research can be the best approach for 
investigating newer phenomenon, providing depth and detail which may than lead on 
to more established research methodologies (Rusinová, Pochard, Kentish-Barnes, 
Chaize & Azoulay, 2009). 
 All the studies in this review have contributed to this process, with quantitative 
research starting to emerge and be explored in this area (see quantitative research 
section), however these papers also provide rich narratives and description of 
thoughts, feelings, perspectives and perceptions that would have been lost or were 
unable to be expressed through the quantitative methodology, with most of these 
papers exploring potential applications of their results to practice. Furthermore, whilst 
the research in this area has generally found similar themes, of a sense of loss or an 
element of post-traumatic growth and positivity, these studies have all come to these 
conclusions through different methodologies and sample types, underlining how 
important and prevalent these feelings seem to be in this population.  
1.8.10 Findings from qualitative studies: The impact of an ABI on self-identity. 
 The qualitative studies discussed in this literature review have generated 
themes which describe a more balanced view of self following brain injury. If we are 
to synthesise the qualitative research throughout this literature review, using a 
thematic methodology (Thomas & Harden, 2008), three distinct overarching themes 
emerge, often found across multiple studies, alongside a forth, more general theme. 
The first theme to emerge from this literature was primarily around the sadness and 
loss of the participants ‘past self’ and the distress that emerges from a negative 
comparison to their post-injury self. This change occurred in regards not only to lost 
skills and abilities, but from a change in their bodies, their role, their support networks 
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and ultimately, a loss of their place in society. This leads to a sense of dependence on 
others, sensitivity about their difficulties, the increase feeling of ‘deficit’ or 
‘difference’ and a potential assimilation into the medical model, identifying 
predominantly as a ‘patient’. This theme is the one which seemed to most 
conclusively mirror the results found in the quantitative studies. 
 Despite this, however, themes of sadness and loss were also accompanied and 
contrasted by stories of survival, of moving onwards and growing stronger, and the 
positive impact that this event had on their sense of self, often through a re-evaluation 
of life priorities. This often took the form of a greater appreciation of life, of now 
living in the present, and identifying as a survivor, allowing them to understand how 
strong they had been to survive and work through their injuries. Whilst this narrative 
was not as evident in the literature as the first, more negative theme, this sense of 
recovery and moving upwards was a very hopeful one, and was felt very strongly by 
the participants where it was described.  
 Placed between these two themes, which may be broadly seen as negative and 
positive outcomes following brain injury, was a theme which seems to acknowledge 
the confusion in identity that can often emerge following a brain injury. This theme 
acknowledges the somewhat ongoing nature that recovery from a brain injury entails, 
speaking of post-injury identity as a dynamic process between positive and negative 
experiences, a continuous, changing process that never truly stabilises (and this may 
be managed by pushing towards resignation or personal growth, inherent in the other 
two identified themes). Outside of these three main themes, there was also a more 
general theme which may be entitled ‘Who I am’, with considerations to their skills, 
activities, social support and more philosophical thoughts as to who they are now, 
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without being attached to the strong positive, hopeful or negative and despondent 
feelings of the first two themes.  
 1.8.11 Conclusion: What is the impact of an ABI on self-identity? 
 This literature review aimed to address the question of “what is the impact of 
an ABI on self-identity?” Both quantitative and qualitative research was examined to 
try and answer this, with themes and findings emerging around a sense of loss and a 
negative comparison to the past self were a common impact of ABI (e.g., Ellis-Hill & 
Horn, 2000; Nochi, 1997; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984). Conversely, positive themes 
also seemed to emerge, predominantly from the qualitative research (e.g., Lennon et 
al., 2014; Nochi, 2000; Pallesen, 2014)  but also in one quantitative study (Jones et al, 
2011), finding that brain injury can lead to a positive, stronger self, often leading to a 
re-evaluation of their life priorities and being more at ease with themselves. This 
literature emphasised the individual, dynamic nature of identity change following bran 
injury, and emphasised the impact that ABI has on self-identity.  
1.9 Rationale for the current study 
 The literature review identified a range of positive and negative narratives and 
results associated with adjustment to and development of self-identity following brain 
injury. It became evident that there were dynamic and complex tensions between 
grappling with the pre-injury identity and development of a new post-injury identity, 
and how this led to feelings of inadequacy and negative comparison, impacting on 
relationships and activities. This is a growing area of research, with poor self-identity 
or comparison to a past, pre-injury self being hypothesised as an underlying factor for 
models and hypotheses around threat appraisal in brain injury (Goldstein, 1952; 
Gracey et al., 2009; Riley et al., 2004; Riley et al., 2010) and linked with higher 
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instances of affective distress (Cantor et al., 2005, Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Ponsford 
et al., 2014; Vickery et al., 2005). 
 It can be hypothesised therefore that if a survivor perceives a negative 
discrepancy between their past, pre-injury identity and their current, post-injury self, 
this may make them more susceptible to the impacts of perceived negative evaluation, 
fear of task failure or a general threat to sense of self (due to their existing beliefs of 
perceived ability to manage in situations which increase this anxiety). This may lead 
to more attention being paid to these stimuli which are deemed threatening, which 
may lead to avoidance of these threat inducing situations (Gracey et al., 2009; 
Muenchberger et al., 2008; Riley et al., 2004; Riley et al., 2010).  
 However this area has yet to be examined using an experimental methodology, 
with a gap in the research to examine attentional bias to threat in an ABI population. 
Previous research has identified that the most pertinent threat appraisals for those who 
have experienced a TBI were around social situations, personal safety being a concern 
and task performance (Riley et al., 2004), so this study will aim to use such stimuli to 
examine attentional bias in this population using a dot-probe task. The literature 
review outlined the importance of self-identity following a brain injury, and as a 
potential underlying mechanism of threat appraisal, as hypothesised by some (Gracey, 
et al., 2009), then this also needs to be examined within this current study. 
This research will therefore aim to examine attentional bias to threat in an ABI 
population, in order to see if survivors of a brain injury are more sensitive to threat 
stimuli, in line with the identified threat appraisals of Riley et al. (2004), negative 
evaluation and physical threat, and how this may be influenced by the discrepancy 
between past and present self. It was hypothesised that survivors would be more 
sensitive to negative evaluation stimuli as compared to physical threat stimuli, give 
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how themes around social judgement, interaction with the social world and the impact 
on support structures seemed to appear throughout the literature review, in comparison 
to themes relevant to ‘physical’ threat. 
Further to this, given that executive functioning comprises a major factor in 
both attention and response to emotional stimuli  (Jurado & Rosselli, 2006; Peterson 
& Posner, 2012 Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007),  the frequency in which these cognitive 
disturbances are found following brain injury (Arciniegas, Held, & Wagner, 2002; 
McHugh & Wood, 2008), and that impairment in executive function may mean a 
person less able to self-regulate and potentially inhibit their response to emotional 
stimuli (Hofmann, Schmeicel & Baddeley, 2012), this will also be factor which will 
be explored in this study.  
This research will also aim to investigate whether or not greater self-
discrepancy between current and past/ideal self, and increased emotional distress, are 
indicated in a brain injury population, which have found to be linked (Cantor et al., 
2005). Furthermore, research has hypothesised that that poorer comparison to past self 
is a potential underlying factor for threat appraisal in brain injury (Goldstein, 1952; 
Gracey et al., 2009; Riley et al., 2004; Riley et al., 2010). It will therefore be 
examined whether this pre-injury/current discrepancy relates to a greater negative 
evaluation of the self, as demonstrated with greater attention paid to negative 
evaluation stimuli.  
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 1.9.1 Hypotheses. 
It is hypothesised that: 
1. Those with an ABI will show greater attentional bias to threatening words compared 
to neutral words (measured by reaction time to stimuli). This will also be found 
when controlling for executive functioning. 
2. There will be a greater attentional bias towards negative evaluation words, followed 
by physical threat words, with neutral words detected slowest (measured by reaction 
time to stimuli). 
3. Participants with a greater self-discrepancy between past and current self will be 
associated with a greater attentional bias towards negative evaluation threatening 
stimuli. This will also be found when controlling for executive functioninig. 
4. Those with a greater self-discrepancy between past and current self, and current and 
ideal self will show more affective distress as measured by the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale. 
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Chapter Two: Methodology of the Study 
2.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter will describe the design of the thesis study and recruitment of and 
characteristics of participants, alongside a description of ethical issues and calculation 
of power for the sample size. Following this, the procedure and measures used in this 
study will be presented.   
2.2 Design 
 A single sample within-participants quasi-experimental design was used to 
investigate the relationship between attentional bias to threatening word stimuli, and 
how this is influenced by self-discrepancy and executive functioning. Data was 
obtained at a single time point only, gathered via computerised dot-probe task, EF task 
and self-report questionnaire measures.  
2.3 Ethics 
 Guidelines from the British Psychological Society (2004) and Medical 
Research Council (2012) were consulted and considered during the development of 
this project. Ethical approval (Appendix G) was obtained from the Nottingham 2 
proportionate review sub-committee of the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) 
committee East Midlands (reference number: 14/EM/0194). Research governance 
approval and site specific permission was sought for each recruitment site; South 
Warwickshire NHS Foundation Trust (Appendix H/I), Norfolk Community Health 
and Care Trust (Appendix J) and Cambridgeshire Community Services NHS trust 
(Appendix K/L).  
2.4 Power and Sample Size 
A previous study using similar correlational methodologies (Cantor et al., 
2005) found medium to large effect sizes (.54 – .83), and a meta-analysis of dot-probe 
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studies in anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and depression (Peckham, McHugh & Otto, 
2010) found a small - medium effect size (d = .45 and .52 respectively), and these 
were used as a guide for calculating sample size. A power analysis completed using 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009) for a repeated measures ANOVA 
for hypothesis 1, with a proposed medium effect size of 0.25 would require 40 
participants to achieve a power of 0.80 to detect at a significance level set at 0.05. For 
the second part of the hypothesis, involving the covariate of executive functioning, 
there is no pre-existing data in this population to assess whether this factor may 
increase or reduce power (by either explaining some of the variability or adding 
statistical noise) (Mefford & Witte, 2012), and so this data will have to be assessed as 
exploratory and interpreted with caution as regards to power.  
For hypothesis three, the current study contained one potential predictor 
variables - self-discrepancy, with ‘attentional bias to threat’ as the outcome variable 
with executive functioning as a controlled variable. Sample size was assessed using 
power tables (Clark-Carter, 2010, pg. 651), for a correlation of .5 and power of 0.83, a 
sample size of 40 was found to be suitable. An additional power calculation with 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009) was conducted. To achieve a 
power of 0.80, significance level of 0.05 with a correlation of .5 in a bivariate 
correlational model, a sample of 37 was found to be suitably powerful.  
2.5 Consent 
 In order for people with ABI to be considered for inclusion in the study, the 
referring clinicians in the recruitment centres were asked to consider if potential 
participants were capable of informed consent, and to refer only those who met this 
criterion. All participants were informed both verbally and on the consent sheet that 
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they could withdraw from the study at any time, without any repercussions on the 
treatment that they were also receiving.  
2.6 Participants 
Participants were individuals who had sustained an ABI at least 6 months 
previously, recruited from 4 brain injury sites across East Anglia and the Midlands; 
The Oliver Zangwill Centre (n = 6), The Colman Centre for Specialist Rehabilitation 
Services (n = 3), The Evelyn Community Head Injury Service (n = 10) and the Royal 
Leamington Spa Rehabilitation Hospital (n = 16).  Participants were a combination of 
those living in the community, those under outpatient services, those who were 
currently undertaking inpatient neurorehabilitation or were awaiting discharge from 
inpatient neurorehabilitation services. In total 35 participants (6 female) participated 
in the study, all were aged between 24 and 69 years (M=45.6, SD=13.98), and 31 
were right handed. The time since injury ranged from 182 days to 5500 days (M=1127; 
SD = 1230). Information related to further participant demographics are summarised 
below in table 4. 
 In order to be eligible to participate in the study, the following inclusion and 
exclusion criteria had to be met. Individuals had to be aged between 18 and 70, 
sustained an acquired brain injury, and at least 6 months post injury. Individuals were 
excluded if there were significant, severe co-morbid mental health difficulties (such as 
psychosis or bipolar affective disorder), substance misuse problems, or had significant 
cognitive or visual difficulties which would preclude them from taking part, as 
assessed by the referring clinician. Individuals were also excluded if their English 
abilities or literacy level would be insufficient to complete the questionnaires, 
excluding those without English as their first language.  
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Table 7. 
Descriptive Statistics For Participant Demographic Information    
 Sample Frequency Sample Percentage 
Ethnicity 
White 
Mixed 
Indian 
Black African  
 
32 
1 
1 
1 
 
91.43% 
2.86% 
2.86% 
2.86% 
Marital Status 
Single 
Married 
Co-Habiting 
Widowed 
Divorced 
 
7 
23 
3 
1 
1 
 
20% 
65.71% 
8.57% 
2.86% 
2.86% 
Education 
Some Secondary School  
GCSEs 
A-Levels 
Diploma 
Undergraduate Degree 
Postgraduate Degree 
 
1 
7 
4 
8 
12 
3 
 
2.86% 
20% 
11.43% 
22.86% 
34.29% 
8.57% 
Post-injury Employment 
None 
Voluntary 
Paid 
 
16 
5 
14 
 
45.71% 
14.29% 
40% 
Cause of injury 
TBI – Road Traffic Accident 
TBI - Assault 
TBI – Fall 
TBI – Sports injury 
ABI – Stroke/Bleed 
ABI – Encephalitis 
 
14 
2 
6 
2 
10 
1 
 
40% 
5.71% 
17.14% 
5.71% 
28.57% 
2.86% 
N = 35   
2.7 Confidentiality 
Once consent had been acquired, participants were given an identification 
number to be used in place of all names on all response sheets to ensure that data was 
managed in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). Names, identification 
numbers and electronic data were stored in separate, password-protected databases for 
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which access was limited to the researcher. Paper copies of questionnaires were stored 
securely on University of East Anglia premises. Participants were informed that 
confidentiality may have to be broken if the researcher became concerned about their 
safety or the safety of others, raising any concerns with the referring clinicians or their 
GP. They were also informed that their identity would not be revealed in any research 
output.  
2.8 Measures 
2.8.1 Demographic information.  
Individuals were asked their age, gender, ethnicity, educational attainment, 
marital status, the date and nature of injury and post-injury employment status. If the 
exact date of the accident is unknown, this was rounded to the start of the known 
month.  
2.8.2 Modified dot probe task: Stimuli and apparatus. 
A Toshiba Satellite Pro C850 laptop running Windows 7 was used to present 
all displays and to record participant’s responses in this experiment. Stimuli were 
displayed on a 15.6 inch screen with a 1366 x 768 pixel resolution and 60p Hz refresh 
rate, positioned below eye level and at a viewing distance of approximately 60cm. The 
dot probe programme was built and run with OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & 
Theeuwes, 2012). Initial versions of the programme were revised with the assistance 
of professional and service user feedback.  
The visual dot probe task comprised a total of 92 randomised trials. Each trial 
began with the presentation of a white fixation dot in the centre of a black screen for 
500ms. Following this, a pair of words simultaneously appeared to the left and right of 
the fixation cross, presented in upper case lettering for 500ms and were 15cm apart on 
the screen, font size 30. Each trial consisted of a “negative evaluation-neutral”, 
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“physical threat-neutral” or “neutral-neutral” word-pair combinations, and trials were 
counterbalanced in regards to word location. All participants completed 10 practice 
dot-probe trials before the experimental trials began, in order to orient them to and 
prepare them for the task. If required participants would have been entitled to more 
practice trials, however none chose to undertake this.  
 On all trials the offset of the word pairs was followed by the presentation of a 
probe “X” in uppercase writing, appearing in the place of one of the words. 
Participants were instructed to indicate the location of this probe on the screen 
(pressing Z for left and M for right) as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
Participants had to indicate their response before the next trial would start.  
2.8.3 Word list generation. 
The visual dot probe task included 2 different categories of threat-related 
words, Negative evaluation (e.g., stupid, pathetic) and Physical threat (e.g., injury, 
violence), which were chosen in line with previous research which examined threat 
appraisals in a brain injury population and found these threat types important to 
consider (Riley et al., 2004). For each category, 16 words were used, using previously 
published research in social phobia which had been previously identified as having a 
high overall threat rating (Ononaiye, Turpin & Reidy, 2007). Each word was paired 
with a neutral word, with all word pairs matched for length and frequency in the 
English language (Ononaiye et al., 2007). In addition to this, a series of paired neutral 
words were also chosen from lists identified to be of low threat value to act as baseline 
trials during the dot probe (Ononaiye et al., 2007). These word pairs are presented in 
appendix A. 
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2.8.4 Hospital anxiety and depression scale. 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HADS: Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
is a self-report scale consisting of seven items related to depression and seven items 
relating to anxiety symptoms, experienced over the past week and scored from 0 – 3, 
giving a range of 0 – 21, where normal is 0–7, mild is 8–10, moderate is 11–14, and 
severe is 15–21. A systematic review of studies found that a cut-off point of 8/21 for 
each scale gave a specificity of 0.78 and sensitivity of 0.90 for the anxiety scale, and a 
specificity of 0.79 and sensitivity of 0.83 for caseness (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug & 
Neckelmann, 2002).  
Initially developed for use with outpatient populations experiencing somatic 
symptoms related to physical injury, it is a quick, brief measure with good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89), with a test-retest reliability between 0.70 – 
0.85 depending on time since last administration (Herrmann, 1996). It has been widely 
validated across many populations (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug & Neckelmann, 2002) and 
has been used successfully in, and demonstrates a high internal consistency for ABI 
populations (anxiety = 0.92, depression = 0.88, total HADS = 0.94) (Dawkins, 
Cloherty, Gracey & Evans, 2006; Senathi-Raja, Ponsford & Schönberger, 2010; 
Whelan-Goodinsion, Ponsford & Schönberger, 2009). This measure takes between 2 
and 5 minutes to complete.  
 2.8.5 Head injury semantic differential scale - III. 
In order to assess self-discrepancy between present and past self, the Head 
Injury Semantic Differential Scale-III (HISDS-III, Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984) was 
selected due to its ease of administration, ease of completion and established use in 
previous brain injury populations (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; 
Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984; Vickery et al., 2005).  
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The HISDS-III was developed to provide information on the changes in self-
concept of those people who have sustained a brain injury. The scale comprises 18 
adjective pairs for which individuals are asked to rate themselves on a 7 point scale, 
from negative to positive, with ratings summed for a total score ranging from 20 – 
140, higher scores indicating a more positive view of self. Strong internal reliability of 
the HISDS-III has been demonstrated, with a Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of 0.93 and 
a split half Guttman’s coefficient of 0.93 (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000), and takes around 
10 minutes to complete.  
2.8.6 European brain injury questionnaire. 
 The European Brain Injury Questionnaire (EBIQ: Teasdale et al., 1997) was 
selected as a way of categorising and defining the characteristics and difficulties of the 
participants in the current study. The EBIQ comes in 2 parallel versions, a ‘self’ for 
the individual with brain injury to complete, and a ‘significant other’ to be completed 
by someone who knows them well (Teasdale et al, 1997).  The EBIQ contains 63 
questions relating to problems or difficulties that people sometimes experience in their 
lives following a brain injury, divided into 8 specific subscales assessing different 
areas of functioning: Cognitive (13 items); Somatic (8 items); Physical (6 items); 
Impulsivity (13 items); Motivation (5 items); Depression (9 items); Isolation (4 items) 
and Communication (4 items), with a Core scale comprising of 34 of these items. 
These items are rated on a scale of 1 (Not at all), 2 (A little) or 3 (A lot). Test-retest 
reliability has been investigated in research, with correlation coefficients ranging from 
0.55 – 0.90 with a median of 0.76 (Sopena, Dewar, Nannery, Teasdale & Wilson, 
2007), with alternative models also proposed to improve construct validity of the 
measure (Bateman, Teasdale & Willmes, 2009).   
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 2.8.7 Executive functioning: Modified six elements task. 
The Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome (Wilson et al., 1996) 
is a battery developed in response to the awareness that conventional 
neuropsychological tests often failed to capture real difficulties faced by those with EF 
problems. One part of this battery is the Modified Six Elements Test; first described 
by Shallice and Burgesss (1991), a 10 minute task consisting of 6 sub-tasks, including 
story dictation, picture naming and arithmetic problems. They are told to complete at 
least some of the 6 individual subtasks, whilst following rules that govern 
performance. It measures planning, attention, task scheduling and performance 
monitoring, demonstrating inter-rater reliability of .88 to 1, with a high test-retest 
reliability (Wilson, Evans, Emslie, Alderman & Burgess, 1998). It is reliably 
correlated with reported everyday difficulties in EF (Hawkins 2006; Norris & Tate, 
2000).  
2.9 Procedure 
 Potential participants were identified by local clinicians at each of the research 
sites in line with inclusion and exclusion criteria, and were approached by these staff 
for permission for their contact details to be given to the main researchers. In order to 
be considered for the study, staff members were asked if participants were capable of 
informed consent, and those who were unable to provide this were not referred. 
Participants were first approached by the referring clinician to ask permission to be 
contacted by the researcher. Once permission was agreed to, participants were 
contacted by phone and the study was explained to them, and any immediate questions 
were answered.  If they agreed to meet, an appointment time and venue was arranged 
and a letter confirming this, information sheet and researcher contact details were 
 
 
70 
 
posted to them. Prior to data collection, individuals were given another copy of the 
study information sheet to read and were given another opportunity to ask questions.  
Testing took place at a location convenient to the participant, either a 
healthcare setting or at their home, in a private space. Prior to testing, participants 
were given a brief overview of the experiment, the information sheet was reviewed to 
ensure that it was understood, and participants were provided with a consent form to 
sign. Participants were informed that their involvement was voluntary and they could 
stop the experiment at any time without repercussion on their care. 
After signing the consent form, participants completed the demographic 
questionnaire (see Appendix B), followed by the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), Head Injury Semantic Differential Scale-III 
(Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984) and European Brain Injury Questionnaire (Teasdale et 
al., 1997). Following this, the dot probe paradigm was completed, followed lastly by 
the 6 elements test (Wilson et al., 1996). The questionnaires were administered with 
assistance as required (e.g., reading questions aloud or recording participant responses 
on their behalf). The assessment was carried out in a single session that lasted between 
45 and 75 minutes depending on the speed of the participants. 
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Chapter Three: Results of the Study 
3.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter will present the findings of the study, summarising the 
preliminary analysis of results, including descriptive statistics and initial checks for 
parametric assumptions. Following this, it will present the findings for each of the 
hypotheses in turn, before concluding with a summary of the overall findings from the 
study.  
3.2 Data Preparation and Missing Data 
The data was entered on a database on SPSS statistics 19, and explored for 
missing values. Every participant completed a HADS, HISDS-III, EBIQ, 6ET and dot 
probe experiment, and data was collected for all of these measures. An EBIQ 
questionnaire was also given to an independent rater for completion as chosen by the 
participant (a relative or staff member). 30 (86%) of these were returned, and the 
missing data was attributed a ‘missing value’ and recorded as ‘missing’ in the SPSS 
database. All data was included in the analysis, with descriptive statistics on the EBIQ 
derived from the 35 participants with brain injury, and the 30 from the independent 
raters.    
3.3 Testing Assumptions of Parametric Data 
In order to carry out the analyses required for each of the hypotheses, data was 
examined for normality and other assumptions for parametric assessment. These were 
explored with visual inspection of histogram and stem-and-leaf diagrams, alongside a 
non-significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov, with most key hypothesis variables meeting the 
assumptions for planned analyses. Some measures did not meet normality 
assumptions and whilst reflect and square root data transformations were attempted 
(see appendix M/N), these did not make any difference to the results, so the original 
 
 
72 
 
data is presented and parametric assessments were used on the original data, given 
their robustness against violated assumptions, although results were interpreted with 
caution. Tests of heterogeneity of variance were also completed, which showed that 
for the repeated measures ANOVA and ANOVA with covariate required of 
hypothesis one, Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was found to be significant, so 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used to minimise the possibility of type I errors.  
3.4 Descriptive Statistics for the Sample Measures 
3.4.1 Measures of affective distress: HADS. 
Descriptive statistics of the scores obtained from the HADS are displayed in 
table 5. The severity of emotional distress was also classified according to the pre-
described guidelines for the HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) and are displayed in 
table 6. These results indicate that the majority of participants fall into the ‘normal’ 
range for anxiety and depression.  
 
Table 8.  
Descriptive statistics for the HADS 
HADS Scale Minimum Score Maximum Score M Standard Deviation 
HADS – Anxiety 0 17 7.2 4.13 
HADS Depression 0 14 6.14 4.09 
N=35 
Table 9. 
Classification/sample percentages for the HADS    
HADS Scale Normal (0 – 7) Mild (8 – 10) Moderate (11 – 
14) 
Severe (15 – 
21) 
HADS – Anxiety 21 (60%) 6 (17.1%) 6 (17.1%) 2 (5.7%) 
HADS Depression 22 (62.9%) 7 (20.0%) 6 (17.1%) 0 (0%) 
N=35 
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3.4.2 Measures of executive functioning: BADS 6ET. 
Descriptive statistics of the scores obtained from the BADS 6ET are displayed 
in table 7, indicating that executive functioning abilities were varied throughout the 
sample, with a majority indicating some difficulties.  
Table 10. 
BADS 6 Elements test scores and sample frequency    
 M BADS performance Score (sample frequency) 
BADS – 6ET 2.46 1   (9)   2   (8)   3   (11)   4   (7) 
N = 35 
 
3.4.3 Measures of self-discrepancy: HISDS-III.    
Descriptive statistics of the sub-scales of the HISDS-III and overall score are 
displayed in table 8. These indicate that participants predominantly rated themselves 
less favourably on all scales of the ‘current self’ scale, and higher on all scales of the 
‘ideal self’ as compared to themselves prior to their injury.  
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the 
total self-discrepancy scores for pre-injury self, current self and ideal self of the 
HISDS-III. Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had been violated, χ2 (2) = 21.19, p = .0005, therefore degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .679). The results 
showed that there was a significant effect of HISDS-III type, F (1.36, 46.14) = 103.47, 
p = .0005. Post-hoc comparisons using the LSD test indicated that all scales were 
significantly different from each other (p = .0005). 
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Table 11.  
Descriptive statistics for the HISDS-III    
 Pre-injury self 
M (SD) 
Current self 
M (SD) 
Ideal self 
M (SD) 
Bored/Interested 6.4 (0.78) 4.4 (1.57) 6.7 (0.67) 
Unhappy/Happy 5.4 (1.39) 3.9 (1.69) 6.8 (0.41) 
In Control/Helpless 6.4 (0.69) 3.3 (1.14) 6.4 (0.88) 
Worried/Relax 5.3 (1.67) 3.6 (1.90) 6.5 (0.79) 
Satisfied/Dissatisfied 5.5 (1.29) 3.4 (1.63) 6.8 (0.43) 
Despondent/Hopeful 6.1 (1.35) 4.0 (1.74) 6.7 (0.58) 
Self-confident/Lacks confidence 6.1 (1.26) 3.7 (1.69) 6.6 (0.64) 
Stable/Unstable (emotionally) 5.9 (1.23) 3.5 (1.63) 6.4 (0.88) 
Attractive/Unattractive (as a person) 4.9 (1.23) 3.6 (1.66) 6.3 (0.85) 
Of Value/Worthless 6.1 (0.93) 3.6 (1.88) 6.5 (0.82) 
Aggressive/Unaggressive 5.4 (1.67) 4.3 (1.63) 6.1 (1.24) 
Calm/Irritable 5.4 (1.48) 3.6 (1.85) 6.5 (0.70) 
Capable/Incapable 6.5 (0.58) 3.7 (1.38) 6.7 (0.51) 
Dependent/Independent 6.5 (0.75) 3.7 (1.81) 6.6 (0.77) 
Inactive/Active 6.1 (1.15) 4.0 (1.67) 6.6 (0.62) 
Withdrawn/Talkative 5.4 (1.52) 4.3 (1.94) 6.0 (1.03) 
Friendly/Unfriendly 6.0 (1.30) 5.5 (1.30) 6.6 (0.65) 
Patient/Impatient 4.9 (1.73) 4.0 (1.69) 6.1 (1.14) 
Total Score 104.3 (12.08) 70.3 (20.69) 116.7 (7.82) 
N=35 
3.4.4 Measures of sample characteristics/difficulties: EBIQ.  
Descriptive statistics of the scores obtained from the sub-scales of the EBIQ 
and its overall score are displayed in table 9 (35 self-rated forms, 30 other rated forms). 
This measure was used to provide a quantitative measure to characterise the sample, 
indicating that there was a range of difficulties across both scales, indicating a 
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heterogeneous sample. These items are rated on a scale of 1 (Not at all), 2 (A little) or 
3 (A lot), with each subscale being the mean score of the scale items.  
Table 12. 
Descriptive statistics for the EBIQ    
 Self scale - 
M  
Range  Other scale M  Range 
Somatic 1.82  1 – 2.63 1.79 1 – 3 
Cognitive 1.91  1 – 2.77 1.97 1.23 – 3 
Motivation 1.78 1 – 2.80 1.75 1 – 2.80 
Impulsivity 1.79  1 – 3 1.90 1.15 – 2.92 
Depression 1.90  1 – 2.89 1.80 1.11 – 2.89 
Isolation 1.89 1 – 3 1.98 1 – 3 
Physical 1.57  1 – 2.50 1.66 1 – 2.5 
Communication 1.89  1 – 3 1.91 1 – 2.75 
Core Symptoms 1.85 1 – 3 1.87 1.21 – 2.79 
Total Symptoms 115.23 65 – 168 116.60 78 - 179 
N=35 (self); N = 30 (other)  
 A paired samples t-test was conducted to evaluate whether the total symptom 
score between the self-rated and other-rated EBIQ forms showed significant 
differences. There were no statistically significant differences found between the self-
rated form (M=114.77, SD = 26.90) and other-rated form (M=116.60, SD = 25.45), t 
(29) = -.535, p = .597.  
3.4.5 Measures of attentional bias: Dot probe paradigm. 
 All dot probe trial data was screened and trials in which an incorrect response 
was made were removed from the analysis, leading to the removal of 96 trials (2.98% 
of total trials). In addition, reaction times which were recorded as very fast (<200ms) 
were assumed to be anticipatory errors were excluded, alongside very slow trials 
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(>3000ms) which were assumed to be concentration lapses, leading to the removal of 
37 trials (1.15% of total trials). Further to this, three participants were completely 
excluded from the dot probe, two for producing a high level of errors throughout the 
paradigm (20.83% and 29.17% trial errors) and one who had substantive difficulties 
with motor coordination during the task.  
Median reaction time data was used to calculate the averages for each trial 
type for each participant for each participant. This was done to provide a more stable 
measure and minimise the effect of individual cognitive difficulties and variation 
within the trials, which may skew the reaction time data, given the heterogeneous 
nature of cognitive difficulties in ABI. This method has been used previously in 
attentional bias studies to control for outliers in data (Horry & Wright, 2009; 
MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holder, 2002). The means and 
standard deviations of the final sample are presented below in table 10, with these 
represented graphically in figure 3, indicating that trials with a threatening stimuli had 
faster reaction times than neutral only trials. In this figure, ‘congruent’ trials means 
that the probe ‘X’ appeared in place of a ‘threat’ word, ‘incongruent’ means that the 
probe appeared in place of the paired neutral word.  
Attentional bias scores were also calculated by subtracting the reaction times 
of congruent trials (dot probe in place of threatening stimuli) from those of 
incongruent trials (dot probe in place of non-threatening stimuli), in which a positive 
bias score indicates vigilance to threat whereas a negative score indicates avoidance of 
threat. The average attentional bias scores for ‘negative evaluation’ stimuli was 15.41, 
and 11.56 for ‘physical threat’ stimuli, indicating a small attentional bias towards 
threatening stimuli. This bias score will be used to test hypothesis 3.  
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Table 13. 
Average median reaction time data/standard deviation across dot probe trials 
Dot Probe Trial Type M SD 
Neutral – Neutral Trial 609.97 147.47 
Negative Evaluation – Incongruent Trial 587.75 140.16 
Negative Evaluation – Congruent Trial 572.34 127.38 
Physical Threat – Incongruent Trial 586.84 144.44 
Physical Threat – Congruent Trial 575.28 131.18 
N = 32 
 
Figure 3. Average median reaction times and standard error scores across dot probe 
trials 
 
3.5 Hypothesis Testing 
1. Those with an ABI will show greater attentional bias to threatening words compared 
to neutral words (measured by reaction time to stimuli). This will also be found when 
controlling for executive functioning. 
To assess whether those with a brain injury demonstrated a statistically 
significantly greater attentional bias to threatening words compared to neutral words, 
reaction time data between the five dot probe trial types were compared.  
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A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the reaction time data for the 
dot probe trial type, controlling for the covariate of executive functioning (as 
measured by the BADS). Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated, χ2 (9) = 42.03, p = .0005, therefore degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .675). The 
results show that there was no significant effect of dot probe trial type on reaction 
time, when controlling for executive functioning, F ( 2.70, 81.00) = 1.46, p = .234,  2 
= 
.046.  These results suggest that after controlling for executive functioning abilities, 
there were no significant differences in reaction times on each of the trial types. 
Without controlling for executive functioning and with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, reaction time differences were found to be only marginally above 
significance, F (2.70, 81.00) = 2.75, p = .053,  2 = .084. However this may reflect a 
power issue (please see chapter 4 for a full discussion).  
Given the mixed nature of the participant group, a mix of those with clinical 
levels of affective difficulties and those not, preliminary exploratory analyses were 
also undertaken to examine the effect sizes for those with clinical levels of affective 
difficulties (as measured by the HADS) as compared to those without reported 
difficulties. Examining all participants who scored above the clinical cut off on either 
anxiety (HADS-A) or depression (HADS-D) scale (n = 17), effect sizes were found to 
be  2 = .187 (without controlling for executive functioning) and  2 = .121 (controlling 
for executive functioning), compared to those who scored in the ‘normal’ range (n = 
16);  2 = .012 (without controlling for executive functioning) and  2 = .032 (controlling 
for executive functioning). This was also examined in the specific HADS-A ( 2 = .184 
non-controlled,  2 = .105 controlled) and HADS-D groups ( 2 = .200 non-controlled, 
2 = 
.125 controlled).  
 
 
79 
 
 
2. There will be a greater attentional bias towards negative evaluation words, followed 
by physical threat words, with neutral words detected slowest (measured by reaction 
time to stimuli). 
As the main effect was found to be non-significant, post-hoc tests examining 
reaction time speed and attentional biases between trial types were not undertaken.  
 
3. Participants with a greater self-discrepancy between past and current self will be 
associated with a greater attentional bias towards negative evaluation threatening 
stimuli. This will also be found when controlling for executive functioning. 
Partial correlation was used to examine the relationship between self-
discrepancy of past/current self and attentional bias towards negative evaluation, 
whilst controlling for executive functioning. Preliminary analyses were performed to 
ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity, 
which were all met. There was a weak negative correlation found between the two 
variables, controlling for executive functioning, r =  -.253, n = 32, p = .170 (Dancey & 
Reidy, 2004) indicating a non-significant relationship. Without controlling for 
executive functioning, there was still a negative correlation, which was again found to 
be non-significant r = -.252, n = 32, p = .165. This result indicates that a greater self-
discrepancy between past and current self was not associated with a greater attentional 
bias towards negative evaluative stimuli, although this may be an issue of power 
(please see chapter 4 for a further discussion). 
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4. Those with a greater self-discrepancy between past and current self, and current and 
ideal self will show more affective distress as measured by the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale. 
The relationship between self-discrepancy between past/current and 
current/ideal self and affective distress (anxiety and depression) was investigated 
using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. Preliminary analyses were 
performed to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity, with these assumptions all being met. One extreme outlier was 
removed from the analysis (Osborne & Overbay, 2004). Effect sizes (using Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient r) were measured using Cohen’s (1988) criteria, where an effect 
size of .10 indicates a small effect, .30 as a medium effect, and .50 represents a large 
effect.  
There was a moderate negative correlation found between self-discrepancy 
between past/current self and anxiety, r = -.49, n = 34, p = .008, indicating a medium 
effect size, and a moderate/strong negative correlation found between past/current 
self-discrepancy and depression, r = -.67, n = 34, p = .0005 (Dancey & Reidy, 2004), 
indicating a large effect size.  The difference between these correlations was not found 
to be statistically significant, Z = 1.099 , p > 0.05. 
There was a moderate negative correlation found between self-discrepancy 
between current/ideal self and anxiety, r = -.62, n = 34, p = .000, and a strong negative 
correlation found between current/ideal self discrepancy and depression, r = -.71, n = 
34, p = .0005 (Dancey & Reidy, 2004), both indicating a large effect size. The 
difference between these correlations was not found to be statistically significant, z = 
0.649, p > 0.05. The difference between both depression (Z = -0.306) and anxiety 
(Z=0.756) correlations were also not found to be statistically significant. All these 
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results support the hypothesis that greater self-discrepancy between current and 
past/ideal self meant higher levels of reported affective distress.  
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Chapter Four: Discussion 
4.1 Overview of the Chapter 
 This chapter will consider and discuss the main findings of the research in 
relation to each of the hypotheses, and how these may be explained in relation to 
previous research. It will then discuss the theoretical and clinical implications of this 
research, before highlighting potential areas for future research to develop this further.   
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Hypothesis 1:   
Those with an ABI will show greater attentional bias to threatening words compared 
to neutral words (measured by reaction time to stimuli). This will also be found when 
controlling for executive functioning. 
This hypothesis was not supported by the research findings. Whilst median 
reaction time data showed that trials which included threatening stimuli (both negative 
evaluation and physically threatening) demonstrated a faster reaction time to the dot 
probe compared to neutral trials, and that on threat-congruent trials (where the dot 
probe appeared in the location of the ‘threat’ word) they were found faster (indicating 
an attentional bias to these words), analyses revealed that this pattern of results were 
not statistically significant, with the same results appearing when executive 
functioning was controlled for.  
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2:  
There will be a greater attentional bias towards negative evaluation words, followed 
by physical threat words, with neutral words detected slowest (measured by reaction 
time to stimuli). 
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Whilst examination of the raw data indicated that there were some differences 
in reaction times between these trial types, these differences were not investigated 
statistically due to the original main effect not being found.  
4.2.3 Hypothesis 3:  
Participants with a greater self-discrepancy between past and current self will be 
associated with a greater attentional bias towards negative evaluation threatening 
stimuli. This will also be found when controlling for executive functioninig. 
This hypothesis was also not supported, as there was no statistically significant 
association found between these two variables with discrepancy and attentional bias 
only weakly correlated, both when the influence of executive functioning was and was 
not controlled for. 
4.2.4 Hypothesis 4:  
Those with a greater self-discrepancy between past and current self, and current and 
ideal self will show more affective distress as measured by the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale. 
Correlations conducted between these two measures showed that there were 
moderate and strong negative correlations for both anxiety and depression scales with 
both current/ideal and current/pre-injury discrepancies, indicating that a higher level 
of self-discrepancy was associated with higher affective distress. It was found that 
there was a stronger correlation found between anxiety and depression and self-
discrepancy in the current/ideal discrepancy as compared to the pre-injury 
discrepancy. None of these correlations were found to be statistically different from 
each other.  
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4.3Theoretical and Empirical Implications  
4.3.1Attentional bias, executive functioning and self-discrepancy. 
This study was the first to use a visual dot probe task to measure attentional 
bias to threat in an acquired brain injury population, building on research which has 
explored this previously (Riley et al., 2004; Riley et al., 2010) by using an 
experimental paradigm. The pattern of results seems to suggest that there is a possible 
attentional bias to threat-related stimuli following brain injury, but this was not 
established statistically, and that there are other potential factors which may be 
influencing these mechanisms. Whilst this first hypothesis was not supported 
statistically, its results provide interesting avenues which require further thought and 
consideration, such as the role of executive functioning or affective difficulties in 
these mechanisms, alongside other methodological limitations which may influence 
these results. These will be considered and discussed throughout this discussion, 
mindful of the conclusions that can be drawn with such preliminary and somewhat 
explorative data.  
The findings from this study have a number of theoretical implications, the 
first of which provides some indication for possible mechanisms which may underlie 
attentional bias to threat in brain injury populations. Some authors have drawn upon 
theories and put forward ideas that describe anxiety and threat appraisal as the result 
of a ‘threat to sense of self’ or as a result of the discrepancy between past and present 
self, ultimately leading to the adoption of anxiety avoiding strategies (e.g., Gracey et 
al., 2009; Riley et al., 2004; Riley et al., 2010). This has led to cognitive models of 
anxiety-related avoidance being considered as appropriate for helping to understand 
this phenomenon in brain injury, with some beginning to look at a person’s existing 
beliefs and ability to cope with situations as related to this. For example, Riley et al. 
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(2010) found that those with a negative evaluation of their ability to cope with a brain 
injury and self-reported low self-esteem were more likely to respond to threat 
appraisals with avoidance; supporting the concept that threat to self may play a major 
factor in coping with the consequences of a brain injury. This may also have direct 
implications for understanding the results of the current study, as research has 
identified that self-esteem is a predictor of psychological distress after ABI (Cooper-
Evans, Alderman, Knight & Oddy, 2008), and that in this study, exploratory results 
showed that those with increased affective difficulties demonstrated stronger effect 
sizes in the dot probe paradigm, although it was not established whether these were 
statistically significant differences.  
Whilst these ideas are still in their infancy as related to attentional bias to 
threat in brain injury, models in the cognitive-emotion literature around similar 
threat/anxiety related diagnoses (such as social anxiety) can be drawn upon to explore 
this further (e.g., Beck, 1976; Wells & Matthew, 1996). One example of this is the 
Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model of emotional disorder, 
conceptualised by Wells and Matthews (1996) which draws inspiration from cognitive 
theory. This model integrates information processing research with Beck’s (1967b) 
schema theory, putting forward that there is an interaction between automatic 
processing, voluntary processing and self-beliefs, which underlie self-regulatory 
processes. These processes are then managed by plans specified to cope with self-
relevant negative information, such as monitoring for external threat or active 
rumination about specific personal deficiencies. Some of these strategies are worse 
when used as an ongoing long-term strategy, and may ultimately exacerbate 
difficulties. Therefore, if following a brain injury someone begins to have thoughts 
around feeling inferior to others; these self beliefs may be integrated into their threat 
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monitoring processes and responded to negatively. This model also suggests that 
executive functioning is temporarily disrupted by emotional processes, and so in the 
context of existing executive difficulties, this may have an even greater effect. Whilst 
this is only one model which incorporates these ideas, drawing on this cognitive-
affective literature provides an interesting basis to further develop these ideas in a 
brain injury population.  
What some exploratory analyses in the current research found was that once 
executive functioning was controlled for, the level of non-significance rose 
substantially and effect sizes decreased (although these were not investigated 
statistically). This may indicate that executive functioning is an integral part of 
understanding the underlying mechanisms of this attentional bias, in line with its role 
in both attention and response to emotional stimuli (Jurado & Rosselli, 2006; Peterson 
& Posner, 2012; Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007).  
Furthermore, hypothesis three found that the level of self-discrepancy was not 
found to be associated with attentional bias to threat in negative evaluative stimuli. 
This may indicate that rather than being related to ‘threat to sense of self’, this 
attentional bias may be the result primarily of an inability to effectively regulate 
emotional or threatening stimuli. Emotion regulation is a process by which individuals 
modulate and express their emotional experiences or intake of emotionally arousing 
information to respond to environmental demands (Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007; 
Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007; Melka, Lancaster, Bryant & Rodriguez, 2011). This 
regulation can be a conscious, intentional process, or an unconscious process 
occurring without awareness (Gross & Thompson, 2007), and successful emotion 
regulation draws heavily on realms of executive functioning, such as anticipating 
outcomes, planning and executing responses (Banfield, Wyland, Macrae, Münte, & 
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Heatherton, 2004; Gyurak, Goodkind, Madan, Kramer, Miller & Levenson, 2009). 
Gyurak et al. (2009) proposed that down-regulation of fear in response to a 
threatening stimulus requires the integration of perceptual cues, anticipating a 
response to these cues, and the division of an action plan (such as breathing steadily 
and keeping facial muscles immobile) alongside continuously monitoring and 
adjusting ongoing behaviour.  
Extrapolating this understanding to the current study, the executive functioning 
difficulties that have emerged as a consequence of the brain injury may mean that 
participants were less able to effectively manage and respond to the emotional stimuli 
that were being automatically processed during the dot probe task. Similarly, research 
examining attentional biases in those with alcohol dependence problems found that 
attentional difficulties in their population were associated with specific executive 
control deficits; specifically an inability to detect and resolve the conflict between task 
relevant stimulus and the interference provoked by task-irrelevant stimuli (Maurage, 
de Timary, Billieux, Collignon & Heeren, 2014). Further evidence from the literature 
indicates that executive functioning deficits can compromise a person’s ability to 
integrate emotional cues into the decision making process (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; 
Gyurak et al., 2009) and that executive functioning can modulate emotionally laden 
responses, such as delaying gratification (Eigsti et al., 2006; Garon, Bryson & Smith, 
2008) and refraining from expressing a sense of disgust in a socially unacceptable 
setting (von Hippel & Gonsalkorale, 2005). Miyake et al. (2000) put forward the 
conceptualisation that there were three distinct categories which organised executive 
functioning: shifting (being able to switch back and forth between competing tasks), 
updating (mentally manipulating information held in the working memory) and 
inhibition (the ability to constrain inappropriate responses or cognitions); it may 
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therefore be argued that difficulties in inhibition are a major factor to investigate 
further as explaining attentional bias to threat in brain injury. These hypotheses have 
to be considered very carefully within the context of the current study, as the results 
found were only indicative of these results, and found not to be statistically 
significant. 
However, it is unlikely that deficits in executive functioning are solely 
responsible for these results, and it is potentially more appropriate to consider that 
executive functioning difficulties may exacerbate a poorer sense of self, or that the 
emotional stimuli impair the abilities of these cognitive functions, as suggested by 
some cognitive models (Wells & Matthews, 1996). Research has found that threat-
relevant stimuli impair processes associated with executive functioning, and seemed 
to be consistent with the idea that threat-relevant stimuli depletes a shared ‘resource 
pool’ of executive functioning and emotional processing, which was linked to 
differences on inhibitory control and accuracy, depending on threat type (Lindström & 
Bohlin, 2012). Understanding this in the context of the current study, brain injury may 
‘shrink’ the resource pool available to executive functioning and emotional processing 
and, if previous experience have made you more sensitive to threatening stimuli in a 
similar vein to difficulties such as social anxiety (such as being viewed negatively by 
others or previous mental health conditions), these together may result in an increased 
attentional bias towards threat stimuli due to being unable to effectively regulate 
responses. It may require both these elements (impaired executive functioning and 
poor self-concept/affective difficulties) to generate this threat bias following brain 
injury.  
Other theories are also relevant to consider within these ideas, such as anxiety 
leading to an attentional bias by amplifying the responsiveness of the amygdala to 
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threat-relevant cues, and impairing the recruitment of top-down attentional control 
from prefrontal control mechanisms (Bishop, 2007). Similarly, attentional control 
theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007) suggests that anxiety disrupts the 
‘inhibition’ and ‘shifting’ elements of executive functioning. These impairments are 
then associated with an increased influence of the stimulus-driven attentional system 
to threat, as mechanisms which regulate automatic responses are weakened. These 
would be important models to consider adapting to an ABI population.  
Research examining coping strategies may be useful to draw upon as well, as 
these results have potential implications for how we understand how people with a 
brain injury may react when confronted with a difficult situation. Krpan, Levine, Stuss 
and Dawson (2007) found that impaired executive functioning was associated with a 
greater use of emotion-focused coping strategies (e.g., denial and avoidance) and the 
use of fewer problem-focused coping strategies. This is likely due to the disruption of 
‘top-down’ processes which underpin and support cognitive reappraisal and regulation 
of emotions (Etkin, Egner & Kalisch, 2011), and so whilst individuals with a brain 
injury may plan to use particular coping strategies in stressful situations, their ability 
to implement these strategies may be compromised by damage to areas pivotal in the 
control and management of emotional and behavioural self-regulation (Stuss, 2007).  
 Research has found that the ability to flexibly draw upon and utilise a range of 
strategies in different scenarios is much more effective and adaptive than an 
overreliance on one particular coping approach (Carver, Schier & Weintraub, 1989), 
but neuropsychological and executive functioning deficits, such as impaired planning, 
inhibition and cognitive flexibility may compromise people’s ability to draw upon 
effective coping strategies as required in different situations (Ownsworth, 2014,  p.67). 
These papers, drawn together, lend greater credence to the possibility that these threat 
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appraisals/attentional biases are likely due to a combination of pre-existing 
psychological difficulties, ideas about the self and what constitutes a ‘threat to self’, 
compounded by additional difficulties in cognitive processes and executive 
functioning, leading to an inability to effectively manage and respond appropriately to 
emotionally threatening stimuli. 
4.3.2 Self-discrepancy and affective distress in a brain injury population 
Replicating the results of many previous studies (Cantor et al., 2005; Carrol 
and Coetzer, 2011; Ponsford, et al., 2014; Vickery et al., 2005), our results found that 
a greater self-discrepancy between pre-injury and current self was associated with 
increased levels of anxiety and depression. This same result was also found for the 
discrepancy between the current self and the ideal self being correlated with anxiety 
and depression, with ideal self being rated similarly to the pre-injury self in many 
respects. This current/ideal discrepancy has not been as routinely investigated in 
previous research, with only Cantor et al., (2005) reporting similar results using the 
Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer & Brown 1996), Beck Anxiety Inventory 
(Beck, 1993) and The Selves Adjective Checklist and Selves Interviews (Strauman, 
1990) (finding significant correlations only on the selves adjective checklist.).  
Taken together, it is evident that self-identity plays a key part in understanding 
mental health following a brain injury, and that the perceived discrepancy between 
current and ideal self is at least as important as the current/pre-injury discrepancy. 
These results have theoretical implications for understanding the aetiology of 
emotional difficulties following a brain injury. These difficulties are determined by 
multiple factors due to the heterogeneity of these survivors (Cantor et al., 2005; 
Moldover et al., 2004), it may be that understanding how these self-discrepancies are 
related to, or are mediated by other factors involved in emotional difficulties 
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following brain injury, such as social support (Douglas & Spellacy, 2000; Morton & 
Wehman, 1995), past psychiatric history (Ashman et al., 2004; Rapoport, 2012), 
unemployment/poverty (Seel et al., 2003) time post-injury and injury severity 
(Osborn, Mathias & Fairweather-Schmidt, 2014) is an important next step to consider. 
An alternative explanation to these results offered by Cantor et al. (2005) is that those 
with depression generally describe their current selves more negatively, due to 
cognitive biases caused by the depression (Beck, 1967a; 1976), which may be a 
hypothesis that needs exploration in future research. Furthermore, pre-injury/current 
discrepancy has been found to be linked with low self-esteem (Carroll & Coetzer, 
2011), which if linked back to the previous work undertaken by Riley et al. (2010) 
identifying this as a significant factor in threat appraisal , highlights how interlinked 
these concepts are. 
4.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study 
All of the measures used in the study were selected on the basis of good 
reliability and validity, and have been previously used and validated in a brain injury 
population. Furthermore, there was only a small amount of missing data (for the 
‘other’ form of the EBIQ) across the sample, meaning that the constructs involved in 
this study were appropriately measured. The only measure, for which this previous 
application does not apply, is for the visual dot probe task. As this is the first study to 
the author’s knowledge to use this paradigm in a brain injury population, it relied 
upon previous research to aid design, especially drawing upon research which has 
examined individuals with cognitive difficulties (Dodd & Porter, 2011; van 
Duijvenbode, Didden, Voogd, Korzilius & Engels, 2012) to try and minimise 
confounding factors. This paradigm was also shown to service users and professionals 
working in brain injury for their feedback on the paradigm, who made suggestions 
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about increasing the size of font used in the dot probe and considerations around those 
who have photo-sensitive epilepsy. 
Additionally, one aspect of this study which needs to also be considered due to 
the novel nature of this research is exposure duration of the word stimuli. Previous 
research has found that whilst attentional bias is not affected by exposure duration of 
word stimuli in a non-clinical population (Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 1997), 
in anxious populations there is an initial threat reaction at 500ms, but at longer 
durations this becomes either a threat avoidance reaction or no reaction at all to 
emotional stimuli (Mogg, Bradley, Miles & Dixon, 2004; Schofield, Inhoff & Coles, 
2013). Whilst a 500ms stimulus duration was used in this study to try and elicit this 
effect, this participant group has not been explored before, and although it has been 
used in samples with probably developmental delay (Dodd & Porter, 2011), given 
other potential cognitive difficulties, it may be hypothesised that an appropriate threat-
inducing response at this duration cannot be assumed. 
The negative evaluation and physically threatening words chosen to include in 
the dot probe were validated from previous research (Ononaiye, Turpin & Reidy, 2007) 
and were specifically designed for a socially anxious population. These words were 
chosen to be approximately comparable to the  threat-appraisal groups identified in 
Riley et al. (2004) – ‘social situations’(negative evaluation) and ‘situations in which a 
person’s personal safety is a concern’ (physically threatening), and as such the results 
need to be considered in light of this, perhaps using more specific, targeted brain 
injury words in future research.  
Whilst attempts were made to reach a sample size that would satisfy the power 
requirements for all of the hypotheses, this could not be achieved within the time 
constraints for hypothesis one, two and three, which were all underpowered as a 
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result, and it is likely that hypothesis one with a covariate would also significantly 
underpowered. This has to be considered as a potential influence in whether the study 
had the power to adequately detect any effects for this, and so future studies may wish 
to see whether or not this result is replicated in a larger sample. Despite this being 
underpowered, results for hypothesis one without examining executive functioning as 
a covariate were only just above the level of significance, which may indicate that in a 
sufficiently powered study, this result may reach significance. The effect sizes 
reported in this study may therefore act as a basis for sample size estimates of future 
studies.  
It is also worth considering that the analysis used in this study may have 
significantly influenced the results that were found. The inclusion of executive 
functioning as a covariate is likely to have increased the chance of a Type I error, as it 
aims to eliminate its influence as a factor in attentional bias. As previous research 
seems to point towards executive functioning as being a core factor involved in these 
attentional processes, controlling for it as a factor may have meant the odds of 
discovering a true effect may have been hindered. This line of reasoning can also be 
taken with the exploratory statistics around affective distress as an influencing factor 
on dot probe timings. Despite this, the research has tentatively shown that these 
factors are contributory to the process and are in need of further examination, however 
future research may wish to use these variables as independent variables rather than 
covariates, to assess more accurately whether they make a significant contribution to 
the variance in reaction times on the dot probe task.  
This sample was recruited from different centres across the region of East 
Anglia, and from a specialist rehabilitation hospital in Leamington Spa; whilst this 
improved the pool of potential participants, both of these areas have little cultural 
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diversity, alongside other demographic variables (such as higher proportions of 
university educated individuals) which limits the generalisability of the present 
sample. Furthermore, the recruitment criteria for this project meant that the people 
recruited were predominantly more ‘high functioning’ and with less obvious 
impairments comparative to others with a brain injury. Whilst this will have 
strengthened the internal validity of the study by potentially limiting confounding 
factors, these may again impact on the generalisability of findings (although results on 
the individual and informant EBIQ indicated a heterogeneous sample in regards to 
difficulties (see table 9).  
As this sample comprise those with mainly ‘invisible’ symptoms of brain 
injury, this may have had an impact on how sensitive they were to the threatening 
stimuli in the dot probe. Research has found that substantial changes in physical 
appearance following ABI, such as weight changes or visible scarring, have been 
found to contribute to poor self-concept after brain injury, due to perceived or actual 
negative reactions from the public (Morris, Prior, Shoumitro, Lewis, Mayle, Burrow 
& Bryant, 2005). This was not considered as part of this study, and may have 
implications for the data from this project, given that the physical appearance of most 
participants was not substantially changed, recruiting participants with a mixed 
aetiology. However it is likely that if this was explored further, such as examining 
those with visible physical difficulties following stroke, it would likely only 
strengthen the results found in this study.  
Further to this, a limitation that needs to be considered within the wider 
concept of this project is that the original research on which this project is 
predominantly based (Riley et al., 2004; Riley et al., 2010) used samples containing 
only those who had sustained a TBI, whereas this study took participants with any sort 
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of ABI (although 69% of the sample had sustained a TBI). This may have 
implications for how comparable the results are in relation to the research that it is 
based upon, as it is currently not known whether those with other types of ABI have 
different threat appraisals than those who have just sustained a TBI.  
Finally, and very importantly, participants were predominantly without clinical 
levels of affective distress, with only 40% of the participants reporting a clinical 
degree of anxiety or depressive difficulties. Exploratory analysis identified that effect 
sizes were much stronger in those participants with a clinical level of anxiety and 
depression (mild – severe), compared to non-clinical and the whole sample. This has 
implications for both the dot probe and threat-detection aspects of this study. Previous 
meta-analyses have found that attentional bias in the dot probe for mental health 
conditions is generally not found in non-clinical participants (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) 
and that personal and psychological factors as important in understanding threat 
appraisal in brain injury (Riley et al., 2010), this may mean that having a 
predominantly ‘well’ participant group may have therefore diluted this threat bias 
effect. In reference to the previous consideration around analysis, it may be that 
controlling for executive functioning in an already ‘dilute’ sample may have impacted 
on how easily results could be found, and so future research may wish to follow the 
example of previous research which has looked at factors involved in the dot probe 
paradigm (Ononaiye, Turpin, & Reidy, 2007), and examine these factors in a divided, 
high/low structure, in order to better examine their influence.  
4.5 Clinical Implications      
The clinical implications from this study relate predominantly to the 
understanding and treatment of anxiety and depression following brain injury, within 
the discussed limitations of the study. The aetiology of emotional difficulties 
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following brain injury is multi-determined, given the heterogeneity of patients (Cantor 
et al., 2005; Moldover et al., 2004) but, historically, rehabilitation programmes 
primarily focused on cognitive deficits alongside externalising behavioural problems, 
often overlooking emotional and psychosocial adjustment (Kangas & McDonald, 
2011). This has meant that treatment approaches for this population are limited and 
have not adapted to fit the varied needs of those with a brain injury, leaving us with a 
poor understanding of the factors which trigger and maintain these difficulties 
following brain injury (Cantor et al., 2005). 
Despite this, adaptations to psychological therapies have begun to develop for 
those who have sustained an anxiety disorder following ABI, predominantly using 
CBT. Case reports (Ashworth, Gracey & Gilbert, 2011; Williams, Evans & Fleminger, 
2003a; Williams, Evans & Fleminger, 2003b) and group studies (Ashworth, Clarke, 
Jones, Jennings & Longworth, 2014; Bradbury, Christensen, Lau, Ruttan, Arudine & 
Green, 2008; Kangas & McDonald, 2011; Tiersky, Anselmi, Johnston, Kurtyka, 
Roosen, Schwartz & DeLuca, 2005) have found good results for CBT and third wave 
approaches (such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy and Compassion focused 
therapy), although there is also evidence of mixed results in this population as well 
(Anson & Ponsford, 2006; Hodgson, McDonald, Tate & Gertler, 2005) (for a review 
on CBT and ABI, see Waldron, Casserly & O’Sullivan, 2013).  
This thesis found that greater self-discrepancy between current and pre-injury 
self was associated with greater anxiety and depression, replicating results found 
previously in the literature (Carrol and Coetzer, 2011; Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; 
Ponsford, et al., 2014; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984; Vickery et al., 2005). 
Interestingly, it also found that the discrepancy between the current and the persons 
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‘ideal’ self was also associated with greater affective difficulties, an area which has 
not been widely considered within these previous studies (Cantor et al., 2005).  
 It seems, therefore, that it would be beneficial for professionals to measure 
and consider these changes in self-discrepancies as part of general rehabilitation when 
working with those who, following a brain injury, show affective difficulties. The 
evidence for these interventions, at present is moderate and in their infancy, but they 
highlight the need for a greater focus on the impact of assessment and intervention 
within rehabilitation (Ownsworth & Haslam, 2014). It may be that interventions 
which specifically target biases may be an area that needs further attention in this 
population, such as cognitive bias modification (CBM; Beard, 2011). CBM for 
attention most commonly uses a modified version of the dot probe, altering the 
contingency between probes and threat stimuli, guiding attention away from threat 
stimuli by replacing only neutral stimuli with probes (Beard, 2011). Now that 
feasibility for the use of a dot probe in brain injury has been established, this may be a 
viable area to explore further.  
The Y-shaped Model of Rehabilitation (Gracey et al., 2009) also draws 
together these ideas around self-discrepancies into a clinical model, putting forward 
that the process of reintegration and adaptation following brain injury initially 
involves understanding and coming to terms with these discrepancies. This then leads 
to a consolidation of this developing post-injury self, and continued psychological 
growth. This process may be inhibited when there the person still experiences their 
‘self under threat’, and that this threat may lead to the adoption of coping strategies 
which reduce threat in the short term, but fail to resolve these underlying 
discrepancies (Gracey et al., 2009), which is supported by evidence linking threat 
appraisals to the use of avoidance as a coping mechanism (Riley et al., 2010). This 
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thesis supports the underlying assumptions of this model, and it may be able to act as 
a way of formulating difficulties, and both pre-injury/current and current/ideal 
discrepancies may act as a target for intervention, potentially targeting social 
discrepancies, interpersonal discrepancies and personal discrepancies (Gracey et al., 
2009). Furthermore, research has found that discrepancy in sense of identity has been 
associated with shame following a stroke (Dowswell, Lawler, Dowswell, Young, 
Forster & Hearn, 2000), which may have implications for treatments developed to 
focus on shame, such as compassion focused therapy (Gilbert, 2009; 2010). Mental 
health research has found that the use of self-discrepancies as a focus for treatment 
can be used to help understand and treat difficulties (e.g., Crane, Barnhofer, Duggan, 
Hepburn, Fennell & Williams, 2008; Veale, Kinderman, Riley & Lambrou, 2003). 
 Further to understanding possible mechanisms of the development and 
maintenance of post-ABI emotional difficulties, this study’s results in relation to 
executive functioning and threat appraisal may have important implications for 
intervention and treatment, although caution needs to be taken in considering the 
results of the current study for future interventions, given statistical insignificance. 
Studies examining the role of executive dysfunction in mental health treatment have 
found that those with poorer executive functioning skills typically have poorer 
treatment outcomes (Johnco, Wuthrich & Rapee, 2013; Mohlman, 2005; Mohlman, 
2013; Mohlman & Gorman, 2005), that implementing executive functioning training 
into treatment produces better outcomes (Mohlman, 2008) and that specific frontal 
activity of the brain can predict responsiveness to CBT (Kumari et al., 2009).  
This literature, however, has not been applied to a brain injury population, 
instead focusing predominantly on older adults with cognitive difficulties.  Taking 
CBT (Beck, 1995) as an example, the ongoing use of thought restructuring exercises 
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(challenging negative thoughts and generating adaptive thoughts), formulation and 
implementation of behavioural plans and engaging in daily self-monitoring of 
cognitions, behaviours and physiological symptoms all involve the use of executive 
functioning (Mohlman & Gorman, 2005). Therefore if the role of executive 
functioning is not properly accounted for when trying to formulate and treat someone 
for post-TBI affective difficulties using a CBT perspective, this can have serious 
implications for the success of treatment and its subsequent outcomes. Clinicians 
should take this into account when undertaking therapeutic work with patients, either 
augmenting executive functioning training into treatment (Mohlman, 2008) or using 
research which has aimed to rehabilitate executive functioning first (Levine, 
Robertson, Clare, Carter & Hong, 2000; Manly, Hawkins, Evans, Woldt & Robertson, 
2002). This is especially important given the susceptibility to damage to executive 
functioning following TBI, given the vulnerability of the frontal lobes (McHugh & 
Wood, 2008). 
4.6 Suggestions for Future Research  
Further research in this area should firstly aim to replicate the study with 
sufficient statistical power, to see whether or not these potential attentional biases 
towards threat are a real consequence of sustaining a brain injury. It may also be 
clinically relevant to examine whether or not threat appraisal words specific to brain 
injury can be generated and used, to see whether or not a threat appraisal bias is 
detected (indicating whether it’s a specific, or more generalised threat appraisal).  
Additionally, future studies should aim to attend to some of the 
methodological weaknesses raised from this study and areas which were not 
examined, such as focusing on more specific clinical groups (e.g., TBI only) or on 
those with higher levels of affective distress and self-discrepancy, to see whether this 
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strengthens the results found, and to examine whether or not this negative threat bias 
relies on impaired levels of executive functioning and poor self-concept/distress 
coming together. Additionally, future research may wish to examine self-discrepancy 
and attentional bias using specific populations for which this poorer self-concept may 
be a more apparent issue – such as those with visible difficulties, weight changes or 
visible scaring, as mentioned previously (Morris et al., 2005). This would examine the 
finding in this research that self-discrepancy did not seem to influence attention to 
negative stimuli, to see whether this is a consequence of the current studies sample of 
participants.  
The nature of the cognitive and executive functioning difficulties underlying 
this should also be investigated, using questionnaires such as the Dysexecutive 
Questionnaire (DEX; Wilson et al., 1996) or the Behaviour Rating Inventory of 
Executive Function – Adult version (BRIEF-A; Gioia, Isquith, Guy & Kenworthy, 
2000) or neuropsychological assessments which measure different aspects of 
executive functioning or attention, to explore which specific elements of these 
cognitive abilities may contribute to these possible attentional biases. If established, 
this may then lead to novel assessments and interventions aimed at rehabilitating the 
mechanisms maintaining this threat bias.  
If these attentional biases are found to be replicable, and these hypothesised 
variables (executive functioning/psychological or adjustment factors) are found to be 
key in underlying these, future studies should aim to develop assessments to identify 
these biases, and subsequent interventions to help those with these difficulties, 
perhaps through targeting these underlying factors, or through applying treatments 
such as cognitive bias modification (Beard, 2011) to a brain injury population.  
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Furthermore, the links between self-discrepancy and affective distress were 
confirmed in this study, both between the current and pre-injury self, but also between 
the current and ideal self, which needs further investigation in future studies. These 
results and the previous literature it supports, indicate that this link is something that 
needs more attention from clinicians, with models emerging which specifically 
structure rehabilitation around understanding and addressing self-discrepancy in both 
ideal and pre-injury discrepancies (the Y-shaped model; Gracey, et al., 2009) and 
research beginning to examine intervention in brain injury targeting self-concept 
(Ownsworth & Haslam, 2014), which needs further attention in the future.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This study was the first to use a visual dot probe task to measure attentional 
bias to threat in an ABI population, adding an experimental paradigm to the wider 
literature around threat following ABI. A pattern of results emerged which whilst 
consistent with the hypothesis and previous research that those who have sustained an 
ABI will show a stronger attentional bias towards threatening stimuli, as compared to 
neutral stimuli, was found to be non-significant when investigated statistically. 
Analyses indicated that executive function may play an important contributing factor 
in this process. 
 Furthermore, it seems that current mental health or psychological difficulties 
are also a contributing factor, which may partly explain the results of this current 
study as it used a predominantly ‘well’ sample of participants. Further to this, a larger 
self-discrepancy between current self compared to both pre-injury and ideal self was 
associated with increased levels of anxiety and depression, with the current/ideal 
discrepancy being an area that has had less attention prior to this study. However the 
significance of these results must be considered and reflected on carefully, 
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acknowledging that results were non-significant and so conclusions can only be seen 
as tentative at present.  
Despite the methodological limitations, these results have theoretical 
implications for understanding the underlying mechanisms of this threat appraisal, that 
perhaps both executive functioning difficulties and emotional difficulties are required 
to activate this attentional bias. This research may also have implications for 
understanding coping strategies that survivors use to manage these threatening, 
stressful situations. The findings in relation to self-discrepancy and affective distress 
underline the importance of this in understanding emotional distress following brain 
injury.  
The clinical implications of these results relate to the understanding and 
treatment of affective difficulties following brain injury, their potential aetiology and 
the impact that executive functioning and self-discrepancy may have on potential 
interventions. These results also provide potential support to models of rehabilitation 
(such as Y-shaped model; Gracey, et al., 2009) which place these ideas around self-
discrepancy as underpinning factors in understanding adjustment following brain 
injury. It is hoped that the results of the current study, and the new research directions 
that it subsequently opens, will help us to further understand the factors involved in 
attentional bias to threat following brain injury. 
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Appendix A: Table Showing Dot-Probe Word Pairs by Category 
Negative Evaluation 
(paired neutral words) 
Physical Threat 
(paired neutral words) 
Neutral Words 
(paired neutral words) 
STUPID BARREL INJURY SILVER OCTOPUS POTTING 
MOCKED BANNER DISEASE VERSION AGENT BROAD 
FOOLISH GRADUAL LETHAL MARROW FLOORING POSTCARD 
EMBARRASSED TRANSFORMED CANCER SADDLE LEAFLET OATMEAL 
FAILURE BALANCE PAIN BANK GUITAR MILLER 
DISGRACED WAREHOUSE AMBULANCE FLOWERING GINGER RUBBER 
PATHETIC EXTERIOR DEADLY LADDER HOUR MIND 
INFERIOR INVENTOR ILLNESS MUSTARD INCH TOOL 
WORTHLESS CULTIVATE EMERGENCY FURNITURE SAUSAGE PADDOCK 
RIDICULED PICTORAL VIOLENCE CREATION SHAMPOO GALLERY 
INEPT PURGE DOCTOR CATTLE JUICE VENUE 
CRITICISED INGREDIENT COFFIN ROCKET CREEK SALAD 
INADEQUATE LOCOMOTION STROKE STRING FRESH INDEX 
ASHAMED ORCHARD FATAL PERCH SHEEP SLOPE 
HUMILIATED MINIATURES HOSPITAL NUTSHELL PIANO CREST 
INCOMPETENT MANUFACTURE CORONARY SNAPSHOT CARROT DONKEY 
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Appendix B: Participant Demographic Questionnaire 
Participant Demographics Questionnaire 
 
Participant Number  Age  
Date of 
Assessment 
 Sex  
 
Ethnicity 
 
White     /     Mixed     /     Indian     /     Pakistani   /  
    Bangladeshi     /      Other Asian     / 
Black Caribbean     /     Black African     /    
 Other  Black      /      Chinese      /      Other Ethnic 
Marital Status 
 
Single      /      Married      /     Co-habiting      / 
      Widowed      /     Divorced 
Education 
 
Some Secondary School      /    GCSEs      /      
A-Levels 
Diploma      /     Undergraduate     /     Postgraduate 
 
Post-injury employment 
 
None     /     Voluntary     /      Paid 
Cause of injury 
 
Date of injury 
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Appendix C: Head Injury Semantic Differential Scale – III 
HEAD INJURY SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALE – III 
 
Participant number: 
 
Date: 
 
Pre-Injury   /   Current   /   Ideal 
 
Bored O O O O O O O Interested 
Unhappy O O O O O O O Happy 
In Control O O O O O O O Helpless 
Worried O O O O O O O Relaxed 
Satisfied O O O O O O O Dissatisfied 
Despondent O O O O O O O Hopeful 
Self-
Confident 
O O O O O O O Lacks 
Confidence 
Unstable 
(Emotionally) 
O O O O O O O Stable 
Attractive (as 
a person) 
O O O O O O O Unattractive 
Of Value O O O O O O O Worthless 
Aggressive O O O O O O O Unaggressive 
Calm O O O O O O O Irritable 
Capable O O O O O O O Incapable 
Dependent O O O O O O O Independent 
Inactive O O O O O O O Active 
Withdrawn O O O O O O O Talkative 
Friendly O O O O O O O Unfriendly 
Patient O O O O O O O Impatient 
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Appendix D: European Brain Injury Questionnaire      
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152 
 
 
 
 
153 
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Appendix E: Participant Information Sheet (with Oliver Zangwill heading) 
 
Information Sheet for Participants – 4th February 2014 
Threat appraisal following acquired brain injury: The role of self-discrepancy 
Researcher: Liam Gilligan (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
 Supervised by: Dr Margo Ononaiye, Dr Fergus Gracey and Dr Dave Peck  
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology, School of Medicine and Health Sciences, 
University of East Anglia 
My name is Liam Gilligan; I am a trainee Clinical Psychologist doing a research study as part 
of my training at the University of East Anglia. You are being invited to take part in this 
research. Before you take part in this research, it is important that you understand why this 
is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take some time to read it carefully, and feel free to ask if anything is not clear or you 
wish to discuss it further. 
 Purpose of the study: 
People who have had a brain injury can experience a range of difficulties which can change 
how they choose to do things on a day-to-day basis. Some of these might be related to the 
amount of attention that they pay to things which they think are threatening to them, such 
as people judging them negatively. This research wants to find out more about attention in 
people who have had a brain injury, and how this is affected by certain things, such as what 
that person thinks of themselves. 
 Why have I been chosen? 
You have been invited to take part in this research because you have experienced a brain 
injury in the past.  
 Do I have to take part? 
No, it is up to you whether you wish to take part in the study. If you decide not to take part, 
it will not affect any of your care or activities, and you can choose to stop during the study at 
any time.  
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 What will happen if I choose to take part? 
If you agree to take part, a time will be arranged a time for me to visit, when I can answer 
any questions that you have. You will have to complete a consent form and fill in some 
details about yourself (such as your age). Then you will have to complete some 
questionnaires that look at your mood and some questions about how you see yourself now 
and before your brain injury. You will also have to complete a task on a laptop that should 
take about 20 minutes, and a sorting task that should take about 15 minutes. In total it 
should take between 60 and 90 minutes.  
 Will my results be confidential? 
Yes – everything that is collected from these measures will be kept strictly confidential, so 
no-one else will see them, and all your questionnaires will have a number to use instead of 
your name to ensure this.   
If at any time the researcher becomes concerned that you might be at risk of harming 
yourself or other people, then they will need to break this confidentiality and talk to 
someone involved in your care (either a health worker at your service or your GP) to inform 
them of this. I will try to discuss this with you first if it happens. 
 What will happen to the results of the study? 
Once I have completed all the assessments, I will write a report about the research for the 
University which will be published in an academic journal. Your name and personal details 
will not be in the report.  
 Who is funding and organising this research? 
This research is being funded and organised by the University of East Anglia as part of my 
doctoral research project.  
 Further information and contact details 
If you wish to discuss the project further, please feel free to contact the researcher (Liam 
Gilligan) at [insert email address]. If you have any problems or have any complaints about 
the study then please contact Dr Margo Ononaiye, at [insert email address].  
 
If you wish to discuss this project with someone independent from the project or have any 
concerns or complaints, than please contact [local contact], at [insert email address]  
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet and considering taking part in the research. 
Please feel free to discuss this with anyone else that you wish to (your family, friends and 
health staff).  
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Appendix F: Participant Consent Form (with Oliver Zangwill heading) 
 
Participant Consent Form 
Threat appraisal following acquired brain injury: The role of self-discrepancy 
Researcher: Liam Gilligan (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
 Supervised by: Dr Margo Ononaiye, Dr Fergus Gracey and Dr Dave Peck  
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology, School of Medicine and Health Sciences, 
University of East Anglia 
Please initial the box if you agree  
1. I can confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
4th February 2014 about the above study and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions   
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my health care or 
legal rights being affected 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
Signing this form does not commit you to completing the study. You are free to leave the 
study at any time without having to give a reason for doing so.  
 
_____________________ 
 
Name of Participant 
 
_____________________ 
 
Date 
 
_____________________ 
 
Signature 
 
 
Liam Gilligan 
 
Name of Researcher 
 
_____________________ 
 
Date 
 
_____________________ 
 
Signature  
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Appendix G: Proportionate Review Confirmation Letter 
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Appendix H: Confirmation Letter from South Warwickshire NHS Foundation Trust 
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From: Jo.Williams@swft.nhs.uk [Jo.Williams@swft.nhs.uk] 
Sent: 09 May 2014 08:19 
To: Liam Gilligan (MED) 
Cc: Rob.Poppleton@swft.nhs.uk; Susan.Bleasdale@swft.nhs.uk 
Subject: R&D Approval SWFT080514-01 
Dear Liam 
  
Re: Treat Appraisal following acquired brain injury 
REC: 14/EM/0194 
R&D No. SWFT080514_01 
Protocol: Version 1 04 February 2014 
  
Thank you for your application to undertake the above named study at South 
Warwickshire NHS Foundation Trust. Following review of your submitted paperwork I 
am pleased to inform you that I am in a position to grant R&D approval on behalf of the 
Trust 
  
Should there be a requirement for you to change the protocol you will need to inform me 
and we can look at whether we are still able to support the research. Please ensure your 
site file in kept up to date at all times as it is open to auditing at short notice 
  
Please find attached your letter of access, should you wish to accept the conditions 
please email to confirm 
  
I hope you enjoy working on the study and will look forward to reading the outcome 
  
Kind Regards 
  
Jo 
 
Jo Williams 
Undergraduate Education & Research Manager 
South Warwickshire NHS Foundation Trust 
Room 3 Medical School Building 
Lakin Road 
Warwick 
CV34 5BW 
 Tel: 01926 495321 Ext: 4411 
Mobile: 07785573430 
Fax: 01926 600849 
Website: www.swft.nhs.uk 
This email has been scanned for viruses; however we are unable to 
accept responsibility for any damage caused by the contents. The 
opinions expressed in this email represent the views of the sender, 
not South Warwickshire NHS Foundation Trust nor NHS Warwickshire 
unless explicitly stated. If you have received this email in error 
please notify the sender. The information contained in this email may 
be subject to public disclosure under the NHS Code of Openness or the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000. Unless the information is legally 
exempt from disclosure, the confidentiality of this e-mail and your 
reply cannot be guaranteed. 
Appendix I: Confirmation E-Mail from South Warwickshire NHS Foundation Trust 
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Appendix J: Confirmation Letter from Norfolk Community Health and Care NHS 
Trust 
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Appendix K: Confirmation Letter from Cambridgeshire Community Services NHS 
Trust 
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Appendix L: Letter for access from Cambridgeshire Community Services NHS Trust   
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Appendix M: Attempted data transformations (Median reaction time data: 
Physical stimuli trials) 
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Appendix N: Attempted data transformations (HISDS-III ideal scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
